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SUNRISE, SUNSET: AN EMPIRICAL AND
THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT OF DUALCLASS STOCK STRUCTURES
Andrew William Winden*
A battle is brewing for control of America’s most dynamic
companies. Entrepreneurs are increasingly seeking protection
from interference or dismissal by public investors through the
adoption of dual-class stock structures in initial public
offerings. Institutional investors are pushing back, demanding
that such structures be abandoned or strictly limited through
sunset provisions. The actual terms of dual-class stock
structures, however, have been remarkably understudied, so
the debate between proponents of prohibition and private
ordering is often ill-informed. This paper presents the first
empirical analysis of the initial, or sunrise, and terminal, or
sunset, provisions found in the charters of dual-class
companies, with a data set of 139 U.S. public companies.
Careful selection of such provisions can satisfy both the desire
of entrepreneurs to pursue their idiosyncratic visions for value
creation without fear of interference or dismissal and the need
of investors for a voice to ensure management accountability.
Private law firms representing entrepreneurs in initial public
offerings play a critical role in the selection of charter
provisions, so the onus is on such firms to ensure that private
ordering produces a satisfactory resolution before momentum
builds for a regulatory solution to investors’ concerns.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A modern-day struggle for control of America’s most
dynamic companies is brewing between entrepreneurs and
institutional investors. American entrepreneurs are
increasingly using dual-class stock structures, which allow
them to retain voting control of their companies even after
going public, to obtain protection from interference or
dismissal by institutional investors and activist shareholders.
The adoption of dual-class share structures among companies
conducting initial public offerings (“IPOs”) in the United
States has rapidly accelerated in recent years, from a few
companies per year in the early 2000s to many times that
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number in the last seven years.1 The data set2 of dual-class
companies described in this paper identifies seventy-two
companies that adopted a dual-class structure between 2010
and 2017, including some of the largest IPOs and most
familiar names in America: Facebook, GoPro, Groupon,
LinkedIn, Square, TripAdvisor, Yelp, Zillow, and Zynga. On
March 1, 2017, Snap, Inc. (“Snap”), owner of the popular
Snapchat app, made headlines by going public—in the most
anticipated technology IPO since Facebook’s IPO in 2012—
with a multi-class structure featuring no-vote shares for the
new public shareholders.3

1 See Alice Gomstyn, Supervoters, Stocks, and Silicon Valley: What
Investors Should Know About Dual-Class Voting Structures, THE MOTLEY
FOOL (Dec. 5, 2015, 9:10 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general
/2015/12/05/supervoters-stocks-and-silicon-valley-what-investo.aspx
[https://perma.cc/QRM7-ACW6] (“A growing number of U.S. firms have
adopted [the dual-class] structure: Between 2013 and late 2015, 98
companies newly listed on U.S. exchanges had dual-class IPOs, compared
to 59 between 2010 and 2012, according to data from information provider
Dealogic.”); Steven Davidoff Solomon, Shareholders Vote with Their Dollars
to Have Less
of a
Say,
N.Y. TIMES
(Nov.
4, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/dealbook
/shareholders-vote-with-their-dollars-to-have-less-of-a-say.html
[https://perma.cc/FSC8-NGGY] (“More than 13.5 percent of the 133
companies listing shares on United States exchanges in 2015 have set up a
dual-class structure, according to the data provider Dealogic. That
compares with 12 percent last year and just 1 percent in 2005.”).
2 This Article is substantially based on a data set created by the
author—Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review)—which is detailed infra Part II. The full
data set is on file with the Columbia Business Law Review. The Appendix,
infra, includes a full list of the companies included in the data set as well as
several tables summarizing various features of the data. In an effort to
ensure readability and avoid an excessive use of citations, the Columbia
Business Law Review opted not to cite to the data set each time the author
refers to it, but only when particularly relevant.
3 See Maureen Farrell, Snap IPO Limits Vote to Founders, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 17, 2017, at B1; Steven Davidoff Solomon, When Snap Goes Public,
Some Shareholders’ Voting Rights May Disappear, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/business/dealbook/when-snapgoes-public-some-shareholders-voting-rights-may-disappear.html
[https://perma.cc/W4CU-BSA6].
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Entrepreneurs are often creative visionaries who continue
to develop new ideas and products as their companies grow.
The dual-class structure allows them to pursue their vision for
creating corporate value without the threat of their ideas
being overruled or dismissed by investors who may have less
patience for brilliance to manifest than profit. The ghost of
Steve Jobs looms large in Silicon Valley, in particular.
Founder-entrepreneurs express concern that efforts to recruit
and retain the most talented employees and invest in research
and development for long-term gains may not be understood
or appreciated by markets in the short-term.4 On the other
hand, investors are concerned that, with dual-class stock
structures, especially those involving no-vote shares, expected
long-term value will not be realized and corporate assets may
be wasted.5 In these contexts, dual-class stock structures
leave them with no voice to lobby for changes in policies or
management and exempting companies from the market for
corporate control, which otherwise operates as a check on
management.
Alarmed by the increase in dual-class companies, but
unable to prevent successful companies from utilizing dualclass structures when they come to market, institutional
investors and proxy advisors have mounted a concerted
campaign to pressure regulators to prohibit dual-class
structures and companies to abandon them. T. Rowe Price
announced in March 2016 that it will vote shares held by its
mutual funds against the lead independent directors and all
nominating committee members of companies with dual-class
share structures in future annual meetings. 6 Institutional

4 See Paresh Dave, Snap’s Nonvoting Stock — Everything Sold in the
IPO — Is Junk, Investor Says, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 09, 2017, 11:45 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-snap-no-vote-shares20170309-story.html [https://perma.cc/9MEM-BN7F].
5 See id.
6 Lorraine Mirabella, T. Rowe Price Takes Stand Against Stock
Structures That Create Unequal Shareholder Rights, BALT. SUN (Mar. 19,
2016),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-t-rowe-price-opposedual-class-stock-20160319-story.html (on file with the Columbia Business
Law Review).
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Shareholder Services (“ISS”) announced in November 2016
that for the 2017 proxy season, it would encourage investors
to vote against the boards of directors of companies with dualclass share structures unless they have a “reasonable” sunset
mechanism, and requested comments from investors as to
what constitutes a reasonable sunset mechanism.7 On
January 31, 2017, the Investor Stewardship Group, an
organization of influential institutional investors holding an
aggregate of $17 trillion in assets under management,
announced its new corporate governance principles,8 which
require the directors of public companies with dual-class
shares to “end or phase out controlling structures at the
appropriate time.”9

7 Lyuba Goltser, ISS Proposes New 2017 Voting Policies, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/11/02/iss-proposes-new-2017-votingpolicies [https://perma.cc/BJF6-BMST]; US Policy – Unilateral Board
Actions – Multi Class Capital Structure at IPO, INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDER
SERVS.,
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/
unilateral-board-actions-multi-class-capital-structure-at-ipo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L5MM-EF6U].
8 Leading Investors Launch Historic Initiative Focused on U.S.
Institutional Investor Stewardship and Corporate Governance, BUS. WIRE
(Jan.
31,
2017),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20170131005949/en/Leading-Investors-Launch-Historic-InitiativeFocused-U.S [https://perma.cc/YVY3-2HXQ]. Led by senior corporate
governance practitioners at institutional investor and investment
management firms, the initial members of the Investor Stewardship Group
were: BlackRock, CalSTRS, Florida State Board of Administration, GIC
Private Limited (Singapore’s Sovereign Wealth Fund), Legal and General
Investment Management, MFS Investment Management, MN Netherlands,
PGGM, Royal Bank of Canada Global Asset Management, State Street
Global Advisors, TIAA Investments, T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.,
ValueAct Capital, Vanguard, Washington State Investment Board, and
Wellington Management. Id.
9 The relevant principle states, in its entirety:

Principle 2: Shareholders should be entitled to voting rights
in proportion to their economic interest.
2.1 Companies should adopt a one-share, one-vote standard
and avoid adopting share structures that create unequal
voting rights among their shareholders.
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So the battle lines between entrepreneurs and investors
have been drawn and the stakes are high—absent fraud or
self-dealing, Delaware corporate law generally upholds the
choices of the corporate party or parties with the most votes.10
There is an urgent need for American lawyers to consider how
the respective needs of entrepreneurs and investors can be
satisfied to end the impasse. It is difficult to have an informed
and productive conversation about how to respond to the dualclass phenomenon, however, without a thorough
understanding of the actual terms of dual-class stock
structures.11 Even the most lopsided dual-class structure—
one with no-vote public shares—might be acceptable, for
instance, if it ends after a short period of years or once the
stock price performance falls below a certain level for a set
period of time.
The terms of dual-class stock structures have been
remarkably understudied. This paper fills this gap in the
literature with a taxonomy and census of the initial, or
sunrise, and terminal, or sunset, provisions for 139 U.S. public
companies with dual-class stock structures. This review of
dual-class terms reveals that there are myriad possibilities for
satisfying the needs of both founders and investors in the

2.2 Boards of companies that already have dual or multiple
class share structures are expected to review these
structures on a regular basis or as company circumstances
change, and establish mechanisms to end or phase out
controlling structures at the appropriate time, while
minimizing costs to shareholders.
Corporate Governance Principles for US Listed Companies, INV.
STEWARDSHIP GROUP, https://www.isgframework.org/corporate-governanceprinciples [https://perma.cc/J9DS-ZF43].
10 See, e.g., Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994); Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
11 As Ronald Gilson noted, “To better understand the macroeconomic
impact of efficient controlling shareholder systems, we need to better
understand the micro-level dynamics of this ownership structure. As the
focus of corporate governance scholarship shifts to controlling shareholder
systems, we need to think small.” Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling
Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative
Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1678–79 (2006).
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dual-class form. As described in this paper, companies
adopting dual-class structures have utilized a variety of
sunrise and sunset provisions in the past, and dual-class stock
structures have become more investor-friendly over time,
particularly in the last decade as use of the structure has
proliferated among technology companies. It is also possible
to imagine additional charter provisions that could be used to
satisfy both the entrepreneurs’ need for control and the
investors’ need for influence. When the existing and possible
future options are fully understood and considered, law firms
representing companies pursuing initial public offerings can
and should design multi-class stock structures that weave
together the disparate expectations of entrepreneurs and
investors, making resort to regulatory limitation or
prohibition unnecessary.
Part II of this paper describes the hand collected data set
created to analyze the existing dual-class sunrise and sunset
provisions among public companies in the United States. Part
III describes the sunrise provisions of dual-class structures—
such as the respective voting rights of the high vote and low
vote shares. Part IV describes the sunset provisions of the
companies in the data set. Part V explains the influence of law
firms acting as issuer’s counsel on the design of dual-class
structures used in recent IPOs in the United States. Part VI
discusses standards for evaluating dual-class stock
structures, describing the theoretical background to the
positions taken by entrepreneurs and investors. It then
suggests alternative standards for evaluating dual-class stock
structures based on the fundamental motives of the parties—
entrepreneurs seek control in order to pursue their
idiosyncratic visions for creating value,12 while investors seek
control for influence, voice, and management accountability in
order to minimize diminutions in corporate value through
management agency costs. 13 Finally, Part VII discusses
optimal dual-class share structures, evaluating the various

12 Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate
Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 565–66 (2016).
13 Id. at 569, 576–83.

Control

and
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structures in use today and suggesting possible modifications
in light of the standards discussed in Part VI.

II. THE DUAL-CLASS DATA SET
Despite the controversy over dual-class stock structures,
the actual terms used by such stock structures are remarkably
understudied. In order to promote an informed discussion of
these structures, I created a hand-collected data set of the
sunrise (initial) and sunset (terminal) charter provisions used
by public companies adopting dual-class stock structures. To
keep the number of companies in the data set to a manageable
number, I used slightly different criteria for inclusion of
twentieth and twenty-first century corporations. Among
companies that went public with dual-class stock structures
before 2000, the data set focuses on large- and mid-cap
companies (S&P 500, S&P 400, and Russell 1000 stocks). This
excludes smaller, less dynamic controlled companies that are
arguably more like close corporations, and includes most of
the market value represented by dual-class companies.14
Among companies that have gone public since 2000, the data
set also includes small-cap (S&P 600, Russell 2000) and
unindexed companies, which are earlier in their corporate
lifecycles. Much of the innovation in dual-class stock
structures has occurred in the last ten to fifteen years, so it
was also important to be more inclusive for more recent years
in order to accurately capture the proliferation of creative
sunrise and sunset structures.
To identify companies with dual-class stock structures, I
started with the list of S&P 1500 controlled companies created
by ISS on behalf of the Investor Responsibility Research
Center Institute (“IRRCi”).15 Most of the companies that
14 The Russell 1000 represents more than ninety percent of the market
capitalization of the companies in the Russell 3000, with the Russell 2000
representing only the remaining ten percent. Russell 1000 Index,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/russell_1000index.asp
[https://perma.cc/LB2Y-RZ9A].
15 EDWARD KAMONJOH, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., CONTROLLED
COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD & POOR’S 1500: A FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF

2018.3_WINDEN_FINAL

No. 3:852]

SUNRISE, SUNSET

861

conducted dual-class IPOs in recent years are not included in
the IRRCi study because they are not included in the S&P
1500. To identify more recent dual-class market entrants, I
reviewed the charters of companies with “unequal voting”
provisions in the Takeover Defense database of
SharkRepellent.net provided by FactSet. 16 Many of the
companies in the SharkRepellent database were not actually
dual-class companies giving founders unequal voting rights,
which highlights the need for careful selection of the data set
when creating regression analyses of “dual-class” companies
or doing other empirical research based on these databases. 17
PERFORMANCE AND RISK 84–90 (2016). A significant number of the controlled
companies in the IRRCi S&P 1500 data set created by ISS were S&P 600
small-cap companies that went public before the year 2000 and were
eliminated from the data set as explained supra text accompanying note 14.
16 The SharkRepellent.net database, as of December 17, 2017, included
357 companies with unequal voting provisions, 183 of which were Russell
2000 companies, 111 of which were Russell 1000 companies, 38 of which
were S&P 500 companies and 35 of which were S&P 400 companies. More
than half of the companies in the SharkRepellent.net database were Russell
2000 companies that went public before 2000 and were therefore eliminated
from review. See FactSet Research Systems, Inc., SHARKREPELLENT.NET,
https://www.sharkrepellent.net [https://perma.cc/23GE-LETN].
17 A large number of the companies identified by SharkRepellent.net
as having unequal voting rights are not dual-class companies in the
traditional sense because the unequal voting provisions were not created to
give company insiders greater voting power than their cash-flow rights.
Companies have multiple classes of voting or non-voting common stock for
a variety of reasons unrelated to enhancing the rights of founders. Some
companies identified by the database, such as Aflac, Inc., Carlisle
Companies, Inc., Synovus Financial Corp., and The J.M. Smucker Co.,
employ tenure voting systems, rather than a fixed dual-class system. A
significant number of companies, particularly in the financial services
industry, have unlisted non-voting shares to permit certain investors to
satisfy regulatory limitations on their voting rights in the firm. Others are
yieldcos or other subsidiaries whose control shares are held by corporate
parents. Still other companies have “supervoting” shares to effectively allow
shareholders of Canadian subsidiaries to have a number of votes at the U.S.
parent equal to the number of votes they would otherwise have at the
subsidiary level. Finally, numerous companies in the unequal voting data
base have multiple classes of common equity to facilitate an Up-C IPO
structure. In an Up-C IPO, pre-IPO owners retain flow-through tax benefits
by retaining their economic interest in an existing partnership or LLC
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Finally, I compared my list with the list published by the
Council of Institutional Investors in March 2017 to establish
a final data set of the charter terms of 139 dual-class
companies.18
After identifying companies with multiple classes of
disparately voting common shares, I hand-collected
information regarding the dual-class sunrise and sunset
provisions included in the articles or certificates of
incorporation (collectively, “charters”) of such companies filed
as exhibits in the Security and Exchange Commission’s
(“SEC’s”) Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval
(“EDGAR”) system in order to create the dual-class data set.19
A full list of the companies I included in the data set, listed by
the year in which they went public, or, where known,
otherwise adopted a dual-class structure, is included as
Appendix A.20 Appendix B contains summary tables of sunset

operating entity. Public shareholders are offered shares of a listco
corporation which acquires membership interests in the LLC equal to the
public ownership interest. Pre-IPO investors get a separate class of equity
in the listco which typically gives them listco voting rights equal to their
economic interest in the LLC but no economic claim on the corporation.
Thus, Up-C IPOs in which founders control the listco are generally more
like concentrated ownership structures than dual-class structures. I
excluded all of these companies with “unequal” voting rights from the dualclass data set. While I do not have access to the Dealogic database, I suspect
the Dealogic statistics regarding the number of dual-class IPOs in recent
years cited by the articles listed supra, note 1, inflate the actual number of
dual-class IPOs by including some of the same categories of non-dual-class
firms with multiple classes of common equity included in the
SharkRepellent.net database.
18 The Council of Institutional Investors list of dual-class companies is
available on the CII website. Dual-Class Stock, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL
INV., https://www.cii.org/dualclass_stock [https://perma.cc/UJN6-F7V2].
19 This includes both companies with high vote and low vote common
stock and companies with voting and non-voting common stock, as well as
a few companies, such as Alphabet, Discovery Communications and Under
Armour, with high vote, low vote, and non-voting common stock.
20 While I generally did not include former dual-class companies that
are no longer public, because it is more difficult to identify them and obtain
information about their dual-class structures in currently available
databases, I did include a few companies that have been acquired in recent
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provisions employed by those companies, and Appendix C
contains lists of firms with certain relevant characteristics.
The full data set is on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review.
As will become immediately apparent upon perusing the
list of companies in Appendix A, dual-class adoption in the
twentieth century was by no means limited primarily to
companies in journalism and media (as has been commonly
understood) and twenty-first century adoption has by no
means been limited to technology companies, although the
adoption of dual-class structures by increasing numbers of
technology companies is largely responsible for the rapid
increase in the number of dual-class companies in the last
seven years.

III. SUNRISE PROVISIONS
The initial structural, or sunrise, provisions of a dual-class
stock structure focus on the differing rights of multiple classes
of common stock, most importantly, the general voting and
director election rights. Generally speaking, the other rights
of the different classes of common stock, such as the right to
receive dividends, are indistinguishable. Many of the
companies in the data set also protect low vote shareholders
in change of control transactions by giving all classes the same
consideration upon a change of control or giving low vote
shares a separate vote on such transactions unless the
consideration is the same.21

years for which such information was readily available, such as Cablevision,
DreamWorks, Kayak.com and Molex. See infra Appendix A.
21 These dividend and merger equity provisions are consistent with the
prediction of Goshen and Hamdani’s idiosyncratic vision theory that
founders seek control not to extract private benefits of control, but rather to
protect their ability to pursue their visions for creating above market
returns to be shared ratably with all equity holders, as discussed infra Part
V. See generally Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12.
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A. Historical Background to Sunrise Provisions
The current New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and
Nasdaq rules do not impose any specific requirements for the
sunrise or sunset provisions of dual-class structures—they
only prohibit the mid-course adoption of classes of equity that
dilute the voting power of existing shareholders.22 While the
NYSE generally prohibited dual-class listings from the mid1920s to the mid-1980s,23 the American Stock Exchange
(“AMEX”) and Nasdaq had more flexible policies.24 In 1976,
the AMEX permitted Wang Laboratories to list with a dualclass structure, subject to certain requirements that became
AMEX policy for such listings.25 The “Wang formula,” as it
was called, included the following requirements:
• Limited voting shares must have the ability—
voting as a class—to elect not less than twenty-five
percent of the board of directors.
• The voting ratio may not be greater than 10:1 in
favor of the high vote shares.
• No additional stock may be created that would in
any way diminish the voting rights of the limited
voting shares.
• The high vote shares should lose certain of its
attributes if the number of such shares falls below
a certain percentage of the total capitalization.

22 Voting Rights, NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313.00 (2018);
Voting Rights, Nasdaq Stock Market Equity Rules, § 5640, IM-5640, Voting
Rights Policy (2018).
23 Some exceptions were made––for Ford Motor Company, for example.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule
19c-4, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 569 (1991); Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in
Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy,
54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 700 (1986).
24 The AMEX rule stated: “The Exchange will not approve an
application for the listing of a non-voting common stock issue. The Exchange
may approve the listing of a common stock which has the right to elect only
a minority of the board of directors.” Seligman, supra note 23, at 691.
Regarding NASDAQ’s policies, see Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 575–76.
25 Seligman, supra note 23, at 704.
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It was strongly recommended that the low vote
class have a dividend preference.26
At least twenty-two other companies followed the Wang
formula with initial public offerings on the AMEX and seven
more recapitalized into dual-class structures according to the
Wang formula.27 Other companies started recapitalizing with
dual-class structures as a takeover defense mechanism.28
Competition among the exchanges ensued and the NYSE and
Nasdaq ultimately adopted rules that also permitted dualclass listings, with significantly fewer requirements than
those included in the Wang formula. 29
Efforts to impose structure on dual-class adoptions at the
NYSE and Nasdaq in the course of adapting to the AMEX
approach ultimately came to no avail. In 1985, the NYSE
subcommittee tasked with establishing rules for dual-class
listings proposed a rule permitting listed companies to adopt
a dual-class share structure as long as the voting differential
per share was no more than 10:1 and the rights of the holders
of the two classes of common stock were substantially the
same except for voting power per share. 30 In 1986, the
directors of the NYSE ultimately proposed a rule that did not
include the 10:1 voting ratio or similar rights restrictions.31

26 Id. at 704 n.90 (citing Letter from Richard Scribner, Exec. Vice
President for Legal and Regulatory Affairs of the AMEX to Joel Seligman
(Aug. 15, 1985)).
27 Id. at 704–05.
28 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock
and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13 (1988); M.
Megan Partch, The Creation of a Class of Limited Voting Common Stock
and Shareholder Wealth, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 313, 317, 322 (1987) (describing
forty-three firms that adopted dual-class structures between 1962–84, of
which thirty-three permitted public shareholders to elect a minority of the
members of the board of directors).
29 See supra, note 22.
30 Seligman, supra note 23, at 692.
31 Id. at 693. As of September 30, 1985, ten companies listed on the
NYSE had dual-class share structures, despite the NYSE’s policy against
non-voting shares and dual-class companies. These were Dow Jones, Ford
Motor Co., Hershey Foods, General Motors, General Cinema, Fedders,
Coastal, American Family, J.M. Smucker and Kaufman and Broad. Id. at
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Also in 1985, Nasdaq proposed a rule, which was never
adopted, that would have permitted dual-class share
structures only if they were limited to ten years and had a
voting rights ratio of 10:1.32
While the NYSE and Nasdaq failed to pass rules imposing
limitations on dual-class sunrise structures, and AMEX was
ultimately required to liberalize its requirements to keep up
with them (the AMEX ultimately merged with the NYSE in
2008), the 10:1 ratio included in the Wang formula and
considered by the NYSE and Nasdaq clearly became the
prevailing norm among companies adopting dual-class
structures.33 The Wang formula requirement that noncontrolling public shareholders be permitted to elect a
minority of the directors was adopted much more sparingly.34

B. Voting Rights
A substantial majority of the firms in the data set have
uncomplicated dual-class voting systems in which one class of
common stock, held by founders and some or all pre-IPO
investors, has a significantly greater number of votes on all
matters than the class of common stock that is listed and sold
to public investors. More than sixty percent of the companies
in the data set had a 10:1 difference in voting rights (generally
10x vs. 1x, although a small number of companies originally
listed on the AMEX, still have a 1x vs. 1/10thx voting ratio).
Eleven companies have a ratio lower than 10:1, while six
companies have a ratio greater than 10:1.35
703 n.81. The AMEX had approximately sixty companies with two classes
of stock and the NASDAQ had at least 110. Id. at 703.
32 Id. at 692.
33 See infra Section III.B.
34 See infra, Section III.C.
35 Before the collapse of its dual-class structure into a single class
structure in November 2016, Groupon had a 150:1 voting ratio. Universal
Health Services has a 1000 to 1 voting ratio: the founder, Alan Miller, holds
100% of the Class C shares that have 100 votes per share, while the publicly
listed Class B shares have 1/10th of a vote per share. Andrew William
Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review).
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Another straight-forward sunrise voting structure divides
common stock between shares that have one vote per share
and shares that have no votes per share. Despite the
statements of journalists and pundits to the contrary,36 the
Snap listing and sale of non-voting common stock to public
investors was not the first initial public offering of non-voting
shares. A number of other companies in a variety of industries
have issued non-voting shares. A 1925 offering of non-voting
shares by Dodge Brothers, Inc. led the NYSE to effectively ban
the issuance of nonvoting stock for sixty years. 37 Eight of the
firms in the data set—in a diverse array of industries
including education, insurance, investing, and liquors—
offered public investors nonvoting common stock in the 1970s,
80s, and 90s.38 A few more firms, including Scripps Networks,
The New York Times, and The Washington Post, offered
investors shares with no votes except in the election of
directors.
About thirteen percent of the companies in the data set
have more complicated voting structures. Some firms have
three or four classes of common stock, each with different
voting rights. Others companies, such as Comcast (one third)
and Ford (forty percent), give the founder or founding family
the right to control a significant minority of the voting rights
in the company regardless of equity ownership. Still others
limit the power of the high vote shares or the voting rights of
the low vote shares to a limited number of voting matters,
such as changes of control, executive compensation, and
liquidation.
While most dual-class companies list and offer to the public
only their low or no vote classes of common stock, fifteen of the

36 See Rob Kalb & Rob Yates, Snap, Inc. Reportedly to IPO with
Unprecedented Non-Voting Shares for Public, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2017/02/07/snap-inc-reportedly-to-ipo-with-unprecedented-non-votingshares-for-public/ [https://perma.cc/GJP3-DTC2].
37 Seligman, supra note 23, at 694–99.
38 Snap does appear to be the first technology company to offer public
investors nonvoting shares in its IPO. Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class
Data Set (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
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companies in the data set have listed both their high vote and
their low vote classes of common stock, including several that
originally listed their shares on the AMEX.39 More recently,
several companies have newly listed (or proposed to list) nonvoting common stock after previously listing low vote common
shares.40

C. Director Elections
Another significant sunrise provision included in the
charters of twenty of the dual-class companies in the data set
is the right of public shareholders holding low vote shares to
elect a minority of the directors of the company. These
provisions generally give the low vote stockholders the right
to elect a quarter to a third of the directors. Several of these
companies were initially listed on the AMEX and presumably
included the director election right pursuant to the Wang
formula.41 Several companies controlled by either Barry Diller
or the Nolan family also adopted this structure.42 Nike, which
39 For companies listing both high and low vote shares, see infra
Appendix C.
40 Alphabet, Under Armour, and Zillow Holdings have each listed a new
class of nonvoting common stock in addition to their existing classes of high
and low voting common stock. Facebook and IAC/Interactive proposed to do
so but withdrew their proposals following shareholder lawsuits seeking to
block the issuances. See Blair Nicholas, Mark Lebovitch & Brandon Marsh,

CalPERS Suit Marks Another Loss for Multiclass Stock Plans, LAW360
(Oct. 10, 2017, 1:49PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/957467
/calpers-suit-marks-another-loss-for-multiclass-stock-plans (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review); Deepa Seetharaman & Sarah E.

Needleman, Facebook Abandons Plans to Change Share Structure, Avoiding
Lawsuit, W ALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2017, 7:43 P.M.),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-abandons-plans-to-change-sharestructure-avoiding-lawsuit-1506114877 (on file with the Columbia Business
Law Review).
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Barry Diller controls IAC/Interactive, Expedia, TripAdvisor, and the
Nolan family controls AMC Networks, Cablevision, and The Madison
Square Garden Company. See Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data
Set (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
41
42

2018.3_WINDEN_FINAL

No. 3:852]

SUNRISE, SUNSET

869

listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1980, used this
structure, giving Phil Knight the right to elect seventy-five
percent of the directors and public investors the right to elect
twenty-five percent of the directors, while otherwise adopting
a one share, one vote approach to shareholder voting. Molson
Coors adopted a similar structure with equal voting other
than for directors in 2005.
Most of the companies including a minority right to elect
directors in their charters have provisions in their by-laws
allowing public shareholders to nominate directors for
election at annual meetings of shareholders with advance
notice to the company and the board. The by-laws also
generally permit a majority of acting directors to nominate
directors for election by the minority shareholders. The bylaws do not typically provide for proxy access by the minority
shareholders, however, so the ability of minority shareholders
to get desired directors elected is dependent upon such
shareholders having and using the financial resources
necessary to conduct an independent proxy campaign for the
directors they nominate pursuant to the advanced notice bylaws or similar director nomination provisions.

IV. SUNSET PROVISIONS
Sunset provisions require some or all of the high vote
shares to automatically convert to low vote shares upon the
occurrence of certain events. The companies in the data set
employed a wide variety of sunset provisions, including, most
saliently: (1) no sunset at all, (2) the passage of a set number
of years, typically measured by the anniversary of the listing
(time-based or “listing anniversary” sunsets), (3) the dilution
of high vote shares or controller ownership of such shares
down to a low percentage of the aggregate number of
outstanding common stock shares (dilution sunsets), (4) a
diminution in the number of high vote shares or the number
of high vote shares held by the controller as a percentage of
the controller’s original ownership (divestment sunsets), (5)
the death or incapacity of natural person holders (death or
incapacity sunsets), (6) founder separation from employment
with the company (separation sunsets), and (7) conversion
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upon transfers of the high vote shares to persons or entities
other than permitted transferees (transfer sunsets). Tables
detailing the incidence of various sunset provisions among the
companies in the dual-class data set are included in Appendix
B.

A. No Sunset: Eternal Asymmetric Control
Among the companies in the data set, sixty-four percent of
the companies that went public prior to 2000 and thirty-six
percent of the companies that went public after 2000 did not
have any sunset provisions in their charters at all. Several
more companies have either dilution or divestment sunsets
that are so de minimis as to be meaningless, or included
transfer sunsets excluding transfers to family members. So, a
total of 74 of the 139 companies in the data set, or fifty-three
percent, do not have any effective sunset provisions in their
charters. As the tables in Appendix B show, however, there is
a clear trend toward more companies including more sunset
provisions in their charters over time.43

B. Time-Based Sunsets
Time-based sunsets require automatic conversion of the
high vote stock into low vote stock upon the passage of a
certain number of years following the initial public offering of
the low vote stock. This is presumably what most institutional
investors and proxy advisors are referring to when they insist
that dual-class companies must adopt reasonable sunset
provisions. Only 25 of the 139 companies included in this dualclass data set adopted such a time-based sunset provision.44
The period of time before automatic conversion varies from
five to twenty-eight years. Until 2017, seven years had been
the most frequently chosen period. As a result of several
offerings in 2017 including ten-year time-based sunsets, the
43 While eighty percent of the companies going public before 2000 had
no effective sunset, only forty percent of the companies going public after
2000 had no effective sunset.
44 Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review).
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most frequent period is now ten years. In two cases, the
anniversary sunset is dependent upon the extent to which
high vote shares have been diluted or divested.45 Among the
companies with time-based sunsets in the dual-class data set,
four (Rockwell Automation, Texas Roadhouse, Groupon, and
MaxLinear) have experienced an automatic conversion of
their high vote shares into low vote shares and reclassification
into a single class of common stock.46
There has been a significant increase in the number of
companies adopting time-based sunsets in the last few years,
with thirty-five percent of the companies listing from 2010–
45 The Ironwood Pharmaceuticals certificate provides that if the high
vote shares constitute less than twenty percent of the authorized and
twenty-five percent of the aggregate number of shares of common stock
outstanding, the high vote shares will automatically convert on the eighth
anniversary of the 2010 listing date. Otherwise, they will convert on the
twenty-eighth anniversary. Ironwood Pharm., Inc., Annual Report (Form
10-K) (Mar. 30, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1446847/
000104746911002858/a2202841z10-k.htm [https://perma.cc/8HK9-FCPM].
RingCentral provides that as long as a high vote shareholder and, other
than in the case of a founder, its permitted transferees hold at least fifty
percent of the high vote shares held by such holder at the time of the initial
public offering, the high vote shares held by such stockholder will not
automatically convert pursuant to the otherwise applicable sunset on the
seventh-year anniversary of the initial public offering. RingCentral, Inc.,
Current
Report
(Form
8-K)
(June
3,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1384905/000119312515
212122/d935472d8k.htm [https://perma.cc/TS9C-4FEN].
46 The Rockwell Automation high vote shares converted on February
23, 1997. Rockwell Int’l Corp., Annual Report (Form 11-K) (June 30, 1997),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024478/0001024478-97000009.txt [https://perma.cc/R9N3-7PLC]. The Texas Roadhouse high vote
shares converted on September 30, 2009. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., Current
Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 2, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1289460/000110465909057645/a09-29694_18k.htm [https://perma.cc/QZ76AKVD]. Groupon’s high vote shares converted into low vote shares on
October 31, 2016. Groupon, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 31, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1490281/000119312516753614/d2
74158d8k.htm [https://perma.cc/8MXH-4HBQ]. MaxLinear’s high vote
shares converted into low vote shares on March 29, 2017. MaxLinear, Inc.,
Current
Report
(Form
8-K)
(Mar.
30,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288469/000119312517102630/d3
20231d8k.htm [https://perma.cc/H24M-KJ2J].
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2017 adopting such sunsets, as compared to only three percent
of the companies in the data set that listed prior to 2010. In
2017, forty-one percent of the companies adopting dual-class
structures included time-based sunsets. While the vast
majority of companies with time-based sunsets in the data set
are technology companies listed over the last seven years, and
the number of companies adopting time-based sunsets has
increased significantly compared to prior periods, these
sunsets are neither a recent phenomenon nor limited to the
tech sector. Among time-based sunset adopters found in the
data set are a real estate company, a restaurant chain, and
manufacturers, in addition to software companies. For
example, Helene Curtis, a cosmetics company, adopted a
reviewable five-year time-based sunset in the dual-class
structure it adopted in the 1980s.47

C. Dilution Sunsets
A dilution sunset triggers a conversion of the high vote
shares to low vote shares when the number of high vote shares
declines below a set percentage of the aggregate number of
high vote and low vote shares outstanding. This dilution of the
high vote shares can occur as a result of a decline in the
number of high vote shares through conversion into low vote
shares (typically for sale in the public market) or an increase
in the number of low vote shares as the latter are used to
compensate employees, acquire other companies, or obtain
additional capital for investment in the enterprise.48
Forty-eight of the companies in the data set, eight of which
went public prior to 2000, included a dilution sunset provision
in their charters. Among the forty-eight companies with a
dilution sunset provision, fifty-four percent of them made
dilution below ten percent the trigger for automatic

Gordon, supra note 28, at 80.
Typically, high vote shares and low vote shares are separate series
of common stock and the denominator for purposes of a high vote dilution
sunset provision is the “aggregate common stock outstanding.”
47
48
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conversion.49 One of the companies included in the data set,
Yelp, Inc., collapsed its dual-class structure into a single class
of common stock as a result of triggering its ten percent
aggregate share number dilution provision in 2016. 50
A number of companies in the data set include dilution
conversion triggers based on the percentage of high and/or low
vote shares owned by a founder or controller (as opposed to
the absolute number of high vote shares outstanding). These
provisions come in a variety of versions. The most frequent
version, employed by eight companies, triggers a conversion if
the number of high vote shares (or high and low vote shares,
in aggregate) owned by the founder/controller is lower than a
specified percentage, varying by company between five
percent and twenty-five percent, of the aggregate number of
shares of common stock.51 Two companies established doubletriggers, requiring the founder/controller’s ownership of both
high and low vote stock to fall below a specified percentage of
the total number of such shares of stock.

D. Divestment Sunsets
A close cousin of the dilution sunset is the divestment
sunset, which focuses on the number of high vote shares
issued and outstanding. There are two types of divestment
sunsets: (1) a sunset triggered when the number of high vote
49 In other words, conversion occurs automatically when the high vote
shares constitute fewer than ten percent of the aggregate number of shares
of common stock outstanding (where both high vote and low vote shares are
separate series of common stock).
50 Yelp
Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 22, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1345016/000120677416007234/ye
lp3063374-8k.htm [http://perma.cc/C33P-RFVB]; see also Alfred Lee, Yelp
Shows Way in Supervoting Stock Sunset, THE INFO. (Sept. 26, 2016, 7:01
AM),
https://www.theinformation.com/articles/yelp-shows-way-insupervoting-stock-sunset [http://perma.cc/Y8JT-8VGP].
51 The eight companies are: Altair Engineering, Inc., Caravana Co.,
Houlihan Lokey, Inc., Moelis & Company, SecureWorks Corp., Texas
Roadhouse, Inc., Tilly’s, Inc., and Virtu Financial, Inc. See Andrew William
Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review).
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shares outstanding declines below a set number of shares, and
(2) a sunset triggered when the founder/controller sells more
than a stated percentage of the shares initially held by the
founder/controller. Divestment sunsets focus more directly on
the actions of the controlling high vote shareholders than
dilution sunsets as they are not influenced by the issuance of
additional low vote shares. Thus, while a founder/controller
may still worry about voting dilution through the issuance of
low vote shares over time, she need not worry about collapse
of the dual-class structure as long as she doesn’t sell down the
requisite number of her high vote shares.
The divestment sunset is the fourth most frequently
observed sunset provision, utilized by nineteen of the
companies in the data set, including eight companies
incorporated before 2000. 52 The number of high vote shares
triggering a conversion varies as a percentage of the
authorized and outstanding shares of high vote stock,
depending on the company. Apart from Federated Investors,
Inc., which provides for non-voting common stock to convert
into voting common stock only if there are no voting shares
outstanding,53 the lowest (that is, most difficult to pull)
trigger as a percentage of the number of high vote shares
outstanding at the time of the filing of the certificate is less
than one percent for Forest City Enterprises, Inc.54 The
highest trigger is a number equal to 47.5% of the high vote
shares outstanding, for Ford Motor Company.55 Six
See infra Appendix B.
Federated Inv’rs, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4) (Mar. 20,
1998),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1056288/
0000950132-98-000240.txt [http://perma.cc/Y29R-VKU6].
54 Forest City Enters., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Dec. 9,
2008),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/38067/
000095015208010076/l34747aexv3w1.htm [http://perma.cc/W6RZ-W6SS].
55 Ford Motor Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 22, 2001),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37996/0000037
99601000014/0000037996-01-000014-0002.txt
[http://perma.cc/EGD8Q7D7]. According to Ford’s balance sheet, Ford had seventy-one million
shares of Class B common stock issued and outstanding at the time the
August 2000 certificate of incorporation went into effect. Ford Motor Co.,
Quarterly
Report
(Form
10-Q)
(July
31,
2000),
52
53

2018.3_WINDEN_FINAL

No. 3:852]

SUNRISE, SUNSET

875

companies focus on the number of high vote shares as a
percentage of the number of such shares owned by the
founder/controller at the time of the initial public offering,
with percentages varying between zero percent and fifty
percent.56

E. Death and Incapacity Sunsets
Another form of sunset provides for the automatic
conversion of the high vote shares held by a natural person
into low vote shares upon the death or incapacity of the
shareholder. In some cases, death and incapacity conversion
provisions cause the entire dual-class structure to terminate
upon the death of the founder of the company. In most cases,
death and incapacity conversion provisions provide for
conversion of only the shares held by the affected holder (or
founder). Even the latter provisions can lead to termination of
the structure over time as the limited number of holders of
dual-class shares die or become incapacitated. Some death
and incapacity conversion provisions contain loopholes, which
effectively eviscerate their sunset potential.
Death and incapacity sunset provisions were not a
frequent feature of dual-class stock structures until the
twenty-first century. Only two out of forty-two, or five percent,
of the dual-class data set companies listed in the twentieth
century automatically converted the high vote stock upon the
death of the holder. The numbers have risen dramatically in
the twenty-first century, however, with twenty-two percent of
the data set companies listed in the first decade and fiftyseven percent of the companies listing in the second decade
including such provisions.57 The dramatic increase of death
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37996/000003799600000076/0000
037996-00-000076-0001.txt [https://perma.cc/N5DN-AGZK].
56 These six companies are: Bandwidth, Inc. (40%), Fairway Group
Holdings Corp. (0%), Ironwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (25%), Nutanix, Inc.
(20%), RingCentral, Inc. (50%), and Snap, Inc. (30%). Andrew William
Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review).
57 Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review).
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and incapacity provisions in the last ten years reflects the
significant increase in the number of technology companies
adopting dual-class structures. Most of the companies that
include such provisions are technology companies; many of
the dual-class companies that do not include them are not. 58
As can be seen in the table in Appendix B, like dilution and
divestment sunsets, a variety of approaches to death and
incapacity sunsets have emerged. Some provisions focus on
holders generally, while others focus only on founders. A
majority of the companies including death and incapacity
provisions in their IPO charters after 2009 included both
holders and founders, with conversion of the shares held by a
natural person occurring immediately upon the death of a
holder other than a founder, and nine months after the death
of a founder (sometimes referred to as a “Key Holder”).59 Eight
companies in the data set, including four companies listed in
2017, included a separate sunset providing for collapse of the
entire dual-class structure upon the death of the founder.60
Id.
Some companies have slight variations on this provision. Alphabet,
for example, states that the high vote shares held by a founder will
automatically convert to low vote shares upon the death of the founder
unless previously transferred to another founder, in which case they will
convert nine months after the death of the transferring founder. Alphabet
Inc.,
Current
Report
(Form
8-K)
(Oct.
2,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000119312515336577/d8
2837dex31.htm [http://perma.cc/75YQ-P3Y9]. The Workday charter states
that the high vote shares convert nine months after the death of the last
founder to die. Workday, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Dec. 7, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1327811/000119312512495545/d4
11267dex31.htm [http://perma.cc/9425-872E].
60 These are: Altair Engineering, Inc. (IPO 2017), Blue Apron Holdings,
Inc. (IPO 2017), CarGurus, Inc. (IPO 2017), Hamilton Lane, Inc. (IPO 2017),
Moelis & Company (IPO 2014), NCI, Inc. (IPO 2005), Re/Max Holdings, Inc.
(IPO 2013), and Tilly’s Inc. (IPO 2012). Facebook proposed to include a
charter provision collapsing its dual-class stock structure three years after
the death of Mark Zuckerberg in connection with introducing non-voting
Class C shares. Facebook, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (June 2,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/0001
32680116000074/facebook2016definitiveprox.htm [https://perma.cc/D5R8A9TF]. Since its listing, Facebook has had no death or incapacity sunset
provision. Following a shareholder lawsuit challenging the issuance of the
58

59
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Several of the companies include both incapacity and death
as a trigger for the conversion of the high vote shares held by
the affected person.61 While some of the charters refer to
“disability” rather than “incapacity,” disability is typically
defined for purposes of the provision by reference to legal
incapacity, so incapacity is used here to avoid confusion or
misperception.
Death and incapacity conversion provisions can only be
effective as a sunset provision, however, if they cover not only
the directly held shares of the relevant individual, but also
shares the decedent previously transferred to permitted
transferees (such as trusts, retirement accounts, and other
legal entities for estate planning purposes or otherwise).
Among companies that went public after 2009, a majority of
the holder death and incapacity provisions, and most of the
founder death and incapacity provisions, applied the
automatic conversion to shares held by permitted transferees
and to shares held directly by the individual.62
A number of other variations on the death and incapacity
conversion provision can defeat the sunset effect of the
provision. The charters of some companies state that the high
vote shares convert upon death, unless the shares are
transferred prior to death, and in some cases only if
transferred to another high vote shareholder.63 The charter of
Class C shares, Facebook rescinded the proposal to amend its charter.
Seetharaman & Needleman, supra, note 40.
61 See infra Appendix C.
62 In the case of Zynga, the natural person death and incapacity
provision includes shares held by permitted transferees, but the founder
death and incapacity provision applying to Mark Pincus does not—shares
held by his permitted transferees will not automatically convert upon his
death or incapacity. Zynga, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 13, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1439404/000119312514236407/d7
42303dex31.htm [http://perma.cc/RJ8V-MEUJ].
63 AppFolio, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 6, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1433195/000143319515000003/ex
hibit3163015.htm [http://perma.cc/T68H-WHBV] (allowing conversion upon
death nine months after death unless transferred); Castlight Health, Inc.,
Quarterly
Report
(Form
10-Q)
(May
12,
2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1433714/000143371414000012/ex
hibit31restatedcertifica.htm
[http://perma.cc/AHY3-95T6]
(granting
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one company applies the death conversion provision only to
high vote shares acquired post-IPO, meaning it doesn’t apply
to the founder and fund holders who control the company. 64

F. Separation Sunsets
Three of the firms in the survey have included provisions
in their charters for conversion of high vote stock if the
founder of the company is no longer managing the company.
These provisions are separation sunsets.
Among the companies in the data set, Moelis & Co. broke
new ground when, in connection with its 2014 IPO, it included
a provision in its charter stating that its high vote shares
would be entitled to ten votes per share only if founder, CEO,
and controlling stockholder Kenneth Moelis “has not had his
employment agreement terminated in accordance with its
terms because of a breach of his covenant to devote his
primary business time and effort to the business and affairs
of the Corporation and its subsidiaries or because he suffered
an Incapacity[.]”65
The Moelis & Co. high vote shares would also lose their
additional votes if Kenneth Moelis were ever “convicted of a

automatic conversion unless previously transferred); Ironwood Pharm,,
Inc.,
Annual
Report
(Form
10-K)
(Mar.
30,
2010),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1446847/000104746910002966/a2
197484zex-3_1.htm [http://perma.cc/F8ES-4VT4] (granting automatic
conversion unless previously transferred); RingCentral, Inc., Current
Report
(Form
8-K)
(June
3,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1384905/000119312515212122/d9
35472dex31.htm [http://perma.cc/HCJ7-H6RH ] (excepting conversion upon
death if transferred to another high vote shareholder); Workiva, Inc.,
Current
Report
(Form
8-K)
(Dec.
16,
2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1445305/000144530514005577/w
orkiva8-kexhibit31.htm [http://perma.cc/9UAA-L2DH ] (granting automatic
conversion unless previously transferred).
64 Inovalon, Inc., Amendment No. 4 to Form S-1 (Form S-1/A) (Feb. 6,
2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1619954/00010474691500
0652/a2222935zex-3_1.htm [http://perma.cc/7AXD-FD4K].
65 Moelis & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 22, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1596967/000110465914029215/a1
4-10912_1ex3d1.htm [https://perma.cc/VM49-LSY8].
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criminal violation of a material U.S. federal or state securities
law that constitutes a felony or a felony involving moral
turpitude . . . .”66 This is the only dual-class sunset provision
in the data set that provides for a sunset of the dual-class
structure
upon
a
felony
conviction
of
the
founder/CEO/controlling stockholder. In the case of Moelis,
this sunset is an appropriate complement to the founder
employment termination provision because the laws and
regulations applying to the executives of financial institutions
taking custody of client funds make it difficult for persons who
have been convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude to
serve as executives of such institutions.67
CarGurus, Inc. and Hamilton Lane, Inc., both of which
listed in 2017, included provisions in their charters collapsing
the dual-class structure when the founder(s) voluntarily
terminate all employment and director positions with the
company—in other words, when they are no longer directly
involved in the management of the company. 68
In connection with introducing non-voting Class C common
stock in 2016, Facebook proposed amendments to the dualclass sunset provisions in its charter that would convert its
high vote Class B common stock into low vote Class A common
stock upon the termination for cause or resignation of Mark
Id.
Convicted felons are often prohibited from working in certain
industries under either federal or state law. Commonly prohibited
industries include banking, insurance, health care, and real estate. In the
financial sector, prohibitions typically extend to persons convicted of crimes
involving dishonesty and breaches of trust. For banks and affiliates of
insured banks, see Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(e)(1),
(g)(1)(C), 1829(a) (2012). For credit unions, see Federal Credit Union Act, §
205(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1785 (d)(1) (2012). For investment advisors, see
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(e), (f) (2012). For
broker-dealers, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§
78o(b)(4)(B), (b)(6)(A) (2012).
68 Cargurus, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1494259/0001104659170623
78/a17-24010_1ex3d1.htm [https://perma.cc/7YUF-XZDL]; Hamilton Lane,
Inc.,
Current
Report
(Form
8-K)
(Mar.
10,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1433642/000143364217000035/hl
exhibit31.htm [https://perma.cc/CQU8-Z7HU].
66
67
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Zuckerberg—its founder, CEO, and controlling stockholder—
as CEO, board chairman or another “Approved Executive
Officer” position.69 Following a shareholder lawsuit
challenging the charter amendments, Facebook withdrew the
proposal on the eve of evidentiary hearings in 2017, so the
death and separation sunsets included in the proposal have
not been incorporated into Facebook’s charter.70

G. Transfer Sunsets
In the twentieth century, free transferability of high vote
shares in dual-class companies was the norm.71 Thirty of the
forty-four companies in the data set that listed their shares in
the twentieth century permit free transferability of their high
vote stock. Another ten companies permitted transfers only to
members of the founding family. Two companies included an
outright prohibition on transfers of high vote stock, making
any purported transfer a cause for automatic conversion into
low vote stock.72
The listing of Google, Inc. in 2004 appears to have caused
a sea change in the free transferability of high vote shares.
Google included significant restrictions on the transfer of high
vote shares, including a prohibition barring its founders from
69 For purposes of the “termination for cause” provision, cause was
defined as a variety of deliberate or willful acts of misfeasance that are
“materially and demonstrably injurious to the corporation,” though not
conviction of a felony. No such act was to be considered deliberate or willful
“unless it is done by the Founder in bad faith and without reasonable belief
that the Founder’s action or inaction was in the best interests of the
corporation.” Furthermore, the founder/CEO/controlling stockholder could
not be terminated for cause without sixty days’ notice and an opportunity to
be heard by the independent directors of the board. Facebook, Inc., Proxy
Statement
(Schedule
14A)
(June
2,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680116000074/fa
cebook2016definitiveprox.htm [https://perma.cc/X87H-BB46].
70 Seetharaman & Needleman, supra note 40.
71 For a list of the companies in the survey by date of listing, see infra
Appendix A.
72 See, e.g., Universal Health Serv., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q)
(Aug.
12,
1997),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/352915/
0000893220-97-001362.txt [https://perma.cc/4FVW-DAU7].
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transferring their shares to family members. Only fourteen of
the eighty-four companies in the data set that listed after
Google permitted free transferability of their high vote shares.
That is a remarkable change from the thirty of fifty companies
in the survey listing prior to Google that permitted free
transferability of their shares. The shift is even more
pronounced when one considers the fact that most of the
fourteen firms permitting free transferability after Google
either publicly list the high vote stock73 or were spun out of or
formed from dual-class companies that permit free
transferability themselves. 74
Because charter provisions providing for the conversion of
high vote shares into low vote shares upon transfer can lead
to a change in control of a dual-class company, if not the
collapse of the dual-class structure in its entirety, they are
appropriately considered sunset provisions and can be
referred to as transfer sunsets. As most U.S. dual-class public
companies have listed only their low vote stock, holders of
high vote stock are typically permitted to voluntarily convert
their high vote stock to low vote stock at any time to obtain
liquidity. They may, however, prefer to transfer their high
vote stock directly. If, over time, all of the high vote stock is
transferred and converted upon transfer, the company will
gradually convert to a single class capital structure. Even in
the more likely scenario that some, but not all, of the high vote
stock is transferred and converted, as high vote stockholders
seek liquidity in the public markets, founders or controlling
stockholders can lose control of a company over time—
73 For example, Discovery Communications, Inc. (listed in 2008) did
this. Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review).
74 The following list includes such companies. The information in
parenthesis that follows notes the year and company from which the
company was spun out or formed from. AMC Networks, Inc. (2011–
Cablevision), Expedia, Inc. (2005–IAC/InterActiveCorp), Molson Coors
(2005–Coors), News Corporation (2013–Twenty-First Century Fox), Scripps
Networks Interactive, Inc. (2008–E.W. Scripps Company), TripAdvisor, Inc.
(2011–Expedia), Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., the successor to News
Corporation (2004 as Delaware re-incorporation of The News Corporation
Limited of Australia), and Viacom, Inc. (2005–CBS Corporation). Id.
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particularly if the company also has a dilution sunset
provision.75 Hence, charter provisions that call for conversion
of high vote shares upon transfer can lead to an end, or sunset,
of the control of the company by a particular stockholder.
Charters with strict transfer restraints and provisions for
automatic conversion upon the death of natural person
holders of high vote stock and their permitted transferees—
discussed supra Section III.E.—effectively limit control to the
lifetime of the founder.
Charter provisions that provide for conversion upon
transfer of high vote shares typically include a number of
exceptions. The exceptions have been narrowing over time,
making many of the more recent transfer conversion
provisions more effective as a sunset than earlier ones.
Exceptions that effectively defeat the sunset-forcing
potential of the transfer conversion provisions include
exceptions for transfers to family members, transfers from one
founder to another, transfers to specific stockholders,
transfers to other current high vote stockholders, transfers to
controlled entities, and transfers from stockholders that are
corporations, LLCs, or partnerships to their shareholders,
members, or partners, respectively.
Transfer conversion provisions exempting transfers to
controlling family members, trusts, and other vehicles for the
benefit of the original stockholder and such holder’s family
members do not act as an effective sunset mechanism. Family
exemptions promote the aggregation and extension of control
to the controller and the controller’s descendants,
discouraging family members from breaking ranks and selling
control shares to outsiders, for example. As noted above, to the
extent transfer conversion provisions were included at all by
dual-class companies listing in the twentieth century, they
typically exempted transfers to family members and related
vehicles, retaining control of the company in the family
indefinitely. Tyson Foods, Inc., which listed in 1978, and the
Ralph Lauren Corporation, which listed in 1997, are among

75

50.

This is what happened in the case of Yelp, Inc. See Lee, supra note
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those twentieth century companies that included transfer
conversion sunsets with exceptions for family transfers.76
Three of the companies that went public since 2000 permit
transfers only to family members, 77 while a slightly larger
number of post-2000 companies include transfer sunsets with
exceptions for transfers to founders’ and other high vote
stockholders’ family members.78
Transfer conversion provisions which exempt founder-tofounder transfers similarly retain control in the founding
group, even if one founder decides to divest and diversify. Six
of the companies in the survey, including Alphabet, Inc. (as
successor to Google, Inc.) include such founder-to-founder
exceptions to their transfer conversion provisions, sometimes
referring to the founders as “Key Holders.”79
In a similar vein, some transfer conversion provisions
exempt transfers to specific stockholders, typically controlling
corporate stockholders.80 A broader version of this provision
permits transfer as long as transfer is made to another
existing high vote stockholder. Three of the companies in the
survey included such a provision, one limiting it to high vote
stockholders owning at least one percent of the aggregate
number of shares of high vote stock.81
76 Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review).
77 These are: Coty, Inc., Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., and Virtu
Financial, Inc. Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review).
78 These include: Castlight Health, Inc., Duluth Holdings, Facebook,
Inc., Fitbit, Inc., Globus Medical, Inc., GoPro, Inc., Ironwood
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Phibro Animal Health Corp., Pure Storage, Inc.,
Tableau Software, Inc., Twilio, Inc., and zulily, Inc. Id.
79 The six companies are: Alphabet, Inc., Apptio, Inc., Box, Inc.,
Workday, Inc., Zillow Group, Inc., and zulily, Inc. Id.
80 The following lists examples of companies that have such provisions,
along with the company’s controlling corporate stockholder in parenthesis:
Coty, Inc. (Berkshire), Fairway Group Holdings Corp. (Sterling Advisors),
First Data Corp. (KKR), Houlihan Lokey, Inc. (Orix), and SecureWorks
Corp. (Denali Entities [Dell]). Id.
81 Fairway Group, Groupon, and Inovalon exempt transfers to other
Class B Stockholders. Appfolio, Inc. exempts transfers to registered holders
of at least one percent of the total number of high votes shares. Id.
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Some of the companies have clauses that exempt transfers
to entities controlled by the high vote stockholder, which
permits high vote stockholders to effectively share the voting
rights with one or more third parties who also have interests
in the entity. Several companies include a broader provision
that permits transfers to affiliates or entities that are
controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the
high vote stockholder. A narrower version of this provision
that makes it more challenging to transfer the voting power
requires that the high vote stockholder exclusively control the
entity. Five of the companies in the survey included references
to exclusive ownership. A further refined version of the
provision, which seems to be the most prevalent version
among more recently listed dual-class companies, requires the
high vote stockholder to retain dispositive and voting power
over the shares that are transferred to a different legal entity
(whether the economic rights in the entity are owned and
controlled by the high vote stockholder or not). This latter
provision makes it more difficult to pass along the high vote
shares through an estate, as the argument could be made that
the entity is no longer a permitted transferee after the high
vote stockholder dies and is no longer able to exercise voting
or dispositive power. This presumption that shares
transferred with retention of voting and dispositive power by
the transferor convert upon the death of the transferor can be
and sometimes is made explicit in the death and incapacity
sunset provisions in the charter, as discussed supra, Section
III. E.
The requirement for retention of voting and dispositive
power was introduced by Google at the time of its listing in
2004. The Google provision established a fairly strict approach
to conversion upon transfer, with few exceptions, which were
designed to limit, as much as possible, possession of control to
the founders and high vote stockholders holding shares at the
time of the initial public offering.82 The Google provision does
not permit transfers to family members, or to affiliates, and
82 Google, Inc., Amendment No. 5 to Registration Statement (Form S1/A)
(Aug.
9,
2004),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1288776/000119312504135503/ds1a.htm [https://perma.cc/7K8Q-TBQS].
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prohibits transfers to trusts, individual retirement accounts
(“IRAs”), and other legal entities such as partnerships and
corporations absent ongoing exclusive control over the voting
and disposition of the high vote shares by the original high
vote stockholder/founder.83 The Google provision also states
that the high vote shares transferred to a trust without
conversion may not involve the payment of cash, securities,
property, or other consideration to the transferor.84 The
Google provision does, however, provide an exemption for
transfers of high vote shares by partnerships and limited
liability companies, the kinds of entities typically used by
venture capital investors, to their partners or members,
respectively, pro rata, if the partnership or LLC held five
percent or more of the high vote shares at the time of the
initial public offering.85
The Facebook listing in 2012 took transfer conversion
sunset provisions in a more liberal direction again,
reintroducing provisions for dynastic control, including
permitting transfers to family members without conversion,
and permitting transfers to charitable organizations.86 The
provision also stated that permitted transferees do not lose
their status as permitted transferees by virtue of the death of
the transferor, which perpetuates control beyond the death of
the founder or other high vote stockholders, in direct contrast
to the Google provisions. 87 Also, the Facebook approach

83

Id.

84

Id.

Id.
Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (July 31, 2012), exhibit
3.1,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/00011931251232
5997/d371464dex31.htm [https://perma.cc/V4NR-HQYR].
87 This provision is no longer effective under the amendments proposed
to Facebook’s charter in connection with its creation of no vote Class C
common stock since all Facebook high vote Class B stock would convert to
low vote Class A stock upon the third anniversary of the death or incapacity
of Mr. Zuckerberg. Facebook, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (June
2,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/0001
32680116000074/facebook2016definitiveprox.htm [https://perma.cc/D5R8A9TF].
85
86
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includes a significant loophole permitting third parties to
obtain control over high vote stock by making it easier to
transfer high vote stock to trusts for the benefit of the holder,
family members, or others, by dropping the requirement that
the transferor must retain voting and dispositive control over
the high vote shares held in the trust.
On the other hand, the Facebook approach, which utilizes
a defined term, “Permitted Entity”, is more restrictive than
the Google approach with respect to transfers to other legal
entities. The Facebook approach limits the ability of third
parties to benefit from full or partial ownership of an entity
receiving a transfer of high vote shares by providing that
transfers can only be made to corporations, partnerships, and
other entities owned exclusively by the transferor, rather than
taking the Google approach of insisting that the transferor
retain exclusive voting and dispositive control of the high vote
shares transferred to such an entity (the economic interests in
which might be owned entirely by third parties).

V. LAW FIRMS AND CHOICES OF SUNSET
PROVISIONS
Prior studies have shown that law firms matter—that is,
different law firms choose different terms in preparing the
charter documents for clients pursuing an initial public
offering.88 Investment bankers also play an advisory role in
the choice of charter provisions, such as dual-class sunrise and
sunset provisions, that can affect the pricing of an initial

88 John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses:
Blame the Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (2001) (finding that Silicon
Valley firms were less likely than their New York counterparts to include
antitakeover provisions in IPO charters in 1991–92, but were just as likely
to include such terms by 1998–99); Robert Daines, The Incorporation
Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1595 (2002) (finding that
companies undergoing an IPO are more likely to be incorporated in
Delaware than in their home state when advised by national as opposed to
local counsel); Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering
Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation, J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 31, 31
(2017) (finding that the adoption of exclusive forum selection provisions in
charters and by-laws from 2007–14 was driven by law firms).
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public offering. This dual-class data set similarly suggests
that lawyers and bankers play an important role in the choice
of charter provisions adopted in an IPO. In dual-class share
structures, these parties are particularly relevant to the
nature of the sunset provisions chosen.
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati (“WSGR”) served as
issuer’s counsel to Google in connection with its IPO, and has
also represented several other companies that have adopted
dual-class share structures.89 The Google dual-class structure
broke new ground with fairly strict transfer sunsets and death
and incapacity sunsets for the shares held by its founders,
interrupting the inter-generational transfer of control. Most
of WSGR’s clients have adopted fairly consistent sunrise and
sunset provisions in line with the Google precedent. The
transfer sunset and death and incapacity sunset provisions
were made more restrictive by LinkedIn in 2011, which added
the term “for tax or estate planning purposes” to limit the
instances in which a high vote stockholder could transfer high
vote shares to trusts, IRAs and other entities, and included
shares held by permitted transferees of high vote holders in
the death and incapacity conversion trigger.90 Most of the
companies that adopted the Google model after 2011 included
these phrases.91 Later adopters also typically dropped the
exemptions for transfers by venture funds structured as
partnerships or LLCs.92

89 These include Apptio, Box, Dolby Laboratories, LinkedIn,
MaxLinear, Mindbody, MuleSoft, Nutanix, RingCentral and Square.
Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on File with the Columbia
Business Law Review).
90 LinkedIn Corp., Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation,
Registration
Statement
(Form
S-1/A)
(Mar.
11,
2011),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1271024/000119312511064249/de
x32.htm [https://perma.cc/Q2EM-NNL2].
91 This includes Apptio, Box, MINDBODY, RingCentral and Square,
but not MaxLinear and Nutanix, which permit transfers to family members,
and Dolby Laboratories, which has no sunsets at all. Andrew William
Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review).
92 Id.
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A number of the companies that have gone public after
Facebook have included provisions mimicking the Facebook
provision. Facebook and a number of the companies adopting
its approach (or their investment bankers) were represented
by Fenwick & West in connection with their initial public
offerings.93 Some of the companies that followed the Facebook
approach made their transfer conversion provisions more
strict by importing the Google requirement that the transferor
retain sole dispositive power and exclusive voting control in
their definitions of “Permitted Entity” and “Permitted
Trust.”94 The Cooley law firm (“Cooley”) appeared to begin
with the WSGR approach95 but moved to the Fenwick
approach96 over time.
Cooley, Fenwick & West, and WSGR are all based in
Silicon Valley. The incidence of time-based sunsets, death and
incapacity sunsets, and transfer sunsets prohibiting transfers
to family members declines significantly among both
technology and non-technology companies represented by law
firms that are not based in Silicon Valley. Some of those firms
are regional, and some of their clients are incorporated in
jurisdictions outside Delaware, but many of the firms
adopting more founder and dynasty-friendly dual-class
charters are national firms.97

93 Castlight, Fitbit, GoPro, and Workday were all represented by
Fenwick & West. With the exception of Workday, which listed only a few
months after Facebook, these companies follow Facebook’s original charter,
permitting transfers to family members and declining to include a death
and incapacity sunset. Id.
94 These companies include Pure Storage, Tableau, and zulily, which
were all clients of Cooley, however, and not Fenwick & West. Appfolio also
incorporated this limitation into its definition of “Trust”. Id.
95 Examples include Yelp and zulily. Id.
96 Examples include Pure Storage and Tableau Software. Id.
97 Consider, for example, Globus Medical (Drinker, Biddle), Inovalon
(Morrison & Foerster), Ironwood Pharmaceuticals (Ropes & Gray), Phibro
Animal (Kirkland & Ellis), Reata Pharmaceuticals (Vinson & Elkins), RMR
Group (Skadden), Scripps Networks Interactive (Baker & Hostetler), Swift
Transportation (Skadden; Scudder Law Firm), Tilly’s (Latham & Watkins),
Trade Desk (Latham & Watkins), and Workiva (Drinker, Biddle). Other
firms have chosen to follow the WSGR model include: Groupon (Winston &
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It is clear that issuer’s counsel has more impact on some
matters than they do on others. There is greater variance
among the clients of each of WSGR, Fenwick & West, and
Cooley with respect to matters such as the use of time-based,
dilution, and divestment sunsets. Accordingly, it appears that
such matters receive significantly greater input from clients—
either founders or their boards of directors, which typically
includes venture capital investors—than death and incapacity
sunsets and transfer sunsets, which tend to follow the model
utilized by the firm more consistently.98
Bankers also provide guidance to founders as they consider
dual-class stock structures, based on bankers’ experience from
prior deals regarding the effects of different provisions on the
pricing of deals. It appears that one of the most important
common denominators among the early adopters of timebased sunset provisions in recent years were Morgan Stanley
(as a leading underwriter) and Davis, Polk & Wardwell (as
counsel to the underwriters). Of the first six initial public
offerings that included a time-based sunset provision after
such provisions began to be adopted with regularity in 2010,
Morgan Stanley was involved in five and Davis Polk &
Wardwell was involved in four.99

Strawn), Kayak (Bingham McCutchen), Twilio (Goodwin), Veeva Systems
(Gunderson), Wayfair (Latham & Watkins), and Zillow (Perkins Coie). Id.
98 Five of WSGR’s ten clients in the data set included time-based
sunsets, whereas two of five Fenwick clients did so, and two of five Cooley
clients did so. Id.
99 Morgan Stanley was “lead left”, or the leading bank, in offerings by:
MaxLinear (2010), Groupon (2011), Kayak Software (2012), and Workday
(2012). Morgan Stanley was a joint book-running manager with an equal
allocation to the lead left, J.P. Morgan, in the initial public offering of
Ironwood Pharmaceuticals, the first company in recent years to go public
with a time-based sunset provision, in February of 2010. Morgan Stanley
was not involved in the initial public offering of Yelp (2012). Davis Polk &
Wardwell represented the underwriters in the IPOs of Ironwood
Pharmaceuticals, MaxLinear, Kayak Software, and Yelp. Id.
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VI. EVALUATING DUAL-CLASS STOCK
STRUCTURES
Developing such an understanding of existing dual-class
sunrise and sunset provisions allows for informed discussion
of the burgeoning competition for control between
entrepreneurs and institutional investors. To evaluate dualclass stock structures and establish criteria for considering
different options for designing them, it is important, as an
initial matter, to understand why they are sought by
entrepreneurs and fought by investors.

A. Entrepreneurs Seek Control to Execute Vision
Entrepreneurs seek voting control of their companies postIPO in order to retain the freedom to pursue their unique
visions for creating corporate value—their idiosyncratic
visions—without worry that public shareholders will
challenge their decisions or dismiss them from their positions
as managers or directors of the firms they have built from the
ground up.100 Goshen and Hamdani explain that this is a
natural result of asymmetrical information and differences of
opinion between founders and public investors. 101 Because
entrepreneurs naturally have information about their
businesses that they are not able to make public for
competitive reasons, and because they may have different
opinions from public investors about the best ways to create
value through their businesses, they worry that shareholders
will prevent them from realizing their business plans. Control
enables entrepreneurs to capture the value they attach to the
execution of their idiosyncratic vision, which they believe will
maximize corporate value and produce above-market returns

100
101

See, Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 590.
See generally id.
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in the long term.102 Goshen and Hamdani’s theory is
supported by the words of entrepreneurs themselves.103

102 While capturing the value attached to the execution of an idea is
essentially a non-pecuniary private benefit of control, Goshen and Hamdani
argue that entrepreneurs also seek control in order to increase the size of
the corporate pie—to increase pecuniary benefits generally available to all
shareholders on a pro rata basis. They are not attempting to dictate the pie’s
distribution (through the consumption of pecuniary private benefits of
control, such as engaging in transactions that increase the size of the firm
in order to justify higher compensation for management). Id. at 576. Instead
of assuming that controlling shareholders are expropriators who are
motivated by a desire to consume private benefits at the expense of minority
shareholders, they assert that many controlling owners are instead
motivated primarily by a desire to purse their idiosyncratic visions that they
believe will increase the value of their firms to the benefit of all
shareholders. Id.
103 Noam Wasserman, The Founder’s Dilemma, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb.
2008, at 102, 104 (noting that several entrepreneurs have told Wasserman
“I’m the one with the vision and the desire to build a great company. I have
to be the one running it”); Lee, supra note 50 (quoting Sunny Gupta, CEO
and co-founder of Apptio, justifying a dual-class structure on the basis that
the founders are the ones who “built the company from the ground up”). In
Google’s 2004 Registration Statement, co-founder Larry Page emphasized
the need for autonomy to pursue long-term projects that could create
significant value for shareholders:

In the transition to public ownership, we have set up a
corporate structure that will make it harder for outside parties to
take over or influence Google. This [dual-class] structure will also
make it easier for our management team to follow the long term,
innovative approach emphasized earlier . . . .
The main effect of this structure is likely to leave our team,
especially Sergey [Brin] and me, with increasingly significant
control over the company’s decisions and fate, as Google shares
change hands . . . New investors will fully share in Google’s long
term economic future but will have little ability to influence its
strategic decisions through their voting rights.
. . . From the point of view of long term success in advancing
a company’s core values, the structure has clearly been an
advantage.
Some academic studies have shown that from a purely
economic point of view, dual class structures have not harmed the
share price of companies . . . .
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Entrepreneurs who do not have sufficient personal capital
to own a controlling block of the equity shares of their
companies may seek control through dual-class stock
structures. These structures allow them to leverage their pro
rata equity positions with special shares carrying more votes
than the shares held by other shareholders with equal equity
ownership.
Entrepreneurs have sought dual-class share protection in
greater numbers in recent years as activist investors and
institutional investors have asserted themselves more
actively in corporate governance matters.104 Proponents of
private ordering in corporate governance argue that the rise
of activist and institutional investors has created an
environment in which directors and managers feel pressured
to make decisions raising stock prices in the near term, as
opposed to pursuing long-term plans for value creation.105 The
precise magnitude of the increase in dual-class IPOs as a
percentage of all IPOs is unclear, in part due to the
definitional problems around dual-class share structures
Google has prospered as a private company. We believe a
dual-class voting structure will enable Google, as a public
company, to retain many of the positive aspects of being private.
Google, Inc., Amendment No. 9 to Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), 29–
30 (Aug. 18, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/
000119312504142742/ds1a.htm
[http://perma.cc/QR3A-EPDW].
In
explaining the need for a recapitalization to introduce non-voting stock,
Google’s entrepreneur-controllers repeated this theme: “Technology
products often require significant investment over many years to fulfill their
potential. For example, it took over three years to ship our first Android
handset, and then another three years on top of that before the operating
system truly reached critical mass.” Letter from Larry Page & Sergey Brin
(Apr.
2012),
https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-letters/2011
[http://perma.cc/87CS-952J].
104 See David J. Berger, Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati,
Presentation at the Meeting of the SEC Investor Advisory Committee,
Multi-Class Stock and the Modern Corporation: A View from the Left
(Coast) on Governance Misalignment and the Public Company 5–6 (Mar. 9,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee2012/berger-remarks-iac-030917.pdf [http://perma.cc/UJ6S-4WGK].
105 Id.
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described in the notes to Part II supra, but the trend towards
more dual-class IPOs is clear. 106 Among companies in the
dual-class data set, twenty-three went public in the period
2000–2009, while seventy-two went public in the period 2010–
2017.

B. Investors Seek Control to Minimize Value
Destruction
Investors resist dual-class stock structures based on
principle, insisting that one share, one vote is the only
appropriate corporate governance norm, and based on
concerns
about
value
destruction
through
selfaggrandizement or poor business decisions by founders.107
Investors value control because it allows them to minimize
agency costs and value destruction by exerting influence over
corporate strategy, and electing directors who will dismiss
managers who are destroying value.
The traditional critique of dual-class stock structures is
that they create significant incentives for entrenched
management owners to seek pecuniary and non-pecuniary
private benefits of control, misappropriating or destroying
corporate value in the process. 108 These efforts to divert
106 One frequently cited statistic is that about fifteen percent of the
technology companies that went public between 2012 and 2016 used dualclass share structures, versus only eight percent of such companies between
2007 and 2011. Maureen Farrell, Tech Founders Want IPO Riches Without
Those Pesky Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2017, 12:24 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/control-geeks-tech-founders-want-ipoinvestors-not-their-input-1491236464 (on file with the Columbia Business
Law Review) (citing data compiled by University of Florida finance professor
Jay Ritter).
107 See Richard Teitelbaum, Index Firms Take Issue with Nonvoting
Rights, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
index-firms-take-issue-with-nonvoting-rights-1491739227 (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review); Letter from Ken Bertsch, Council of
Institutional Inv’rs (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.cii.org/files/20170426%
20CII%20comment%20S&P%20no%20vote%20share(1).pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q35B-RYZD].
108 Traditionally, critics of dual-class share structures have argued
that such ownership structures create significant risks of substantial
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corporate value to individual purposes are referred to as
agency costs. Leaving founders in control of companies postIPO presents risks of two kinds of agency costs: management
agency costs and control agency costs. Management agency
costs arise from mismanagement—including reduced
commitment, shirking, and pursuit of acquisitions to increase
size or achieve diversification without generating value.109
Control agency costs involve takings—directly diverting
pecuniary private benefits to the controller through excessive
pay, related-party transactions, and other methods of
diverting corporate value to the controller.110
Control agency costs can be controlled through fiduciary
duties and liability rules, giving courts the power to intervene
and impose penalties on entrepreneur-controllers who take
advantage of their positions to benefit themselves.
Management agency costs are harder to limit than control
agency costs because, by their nature, they are mostly subject
to business judgment review.111 Courts cannot place
themselves in the position of second-guessing management
decisions about corporate strategy.112
Some scholars argue that the risk of management agency
costs increases over time—that is, even if the founder’s vision
produces tremendous corporate value in the first few years
after going public, either the business vision or the founder’s

agency costs as controllers have incentives to seek private benefits of
control. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George G.
Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual-Class Equity: The
Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow
Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295, 301–02 (Randall K.
Morck ed., 2000) (explaining the agency costs inherent in companies with
controlling-minority structure, one of which includes dual-class stock
structures); Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 565.
109 Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 581–82.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 587–88.
112 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698
(Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that “redress for [directors’] failures . . . must come
from the markets, through the action of shareholders and the free flow of
capital, and not from this Court”).
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acumen to execute it decline in later years.113 If this occurs,
the founder may be more apt to make poor business decisions
that impose management agency costs on the shareholders.
While there is no persuasive evidence that founder
capabilities always atrophy with time, there are certainly
firms that have withered under founder management after
showing initial promise.114 Two recent articles in the financial
literature suggest the value of the dual-class structure
declines over time, but they have significant shortcomings.115

113 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for
Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 604–05 (2017); see also
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Columbia Law Sch., Dual Class Common Stock: The
Transformation of Markets Meets the Transformation of Control (Mar. 22,
2017) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review) (noting that the
original owner’s influence over the vision of the company often wanes in the
years after the IPO).
114 Yahoo! is one example that people sometimes raise to illustrate
atrophy of entrepreneurial vision over time since founder Jerry Yang
became CEO of Yahoo! as it was eclipsed by Google and before it became the
target of an unsolicited bid from Microsoft. However, while they remained
directors for many years, Yang and David Filo, the other founder, had ceded
day-to-day management of the firm to a professional manager—Tim
Koogle—before its initial public offering.
115 Cremers, Lauterbach, and Pajuste argue that dual-class firms enjoy
valuation premiums over similarly situated single-class firms, as measured
by Tobin’s Q, at the time of their respective IPOs, but the premium
dissipates over time and becomes a discount after six years from the IPO.
Martijn Cremers, Beni Lauterbach & Anete Pajuste, The Life-Cycle of Dual
Class Firms 27–28 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
550/2018, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3062895 [http://perma.cc/BW6A-YTAJ]. Apart from the fact that the
attribution is purely speculative, there are other significant problems with
their conclusions. First, they rely on the multi-class IPO database created
by Professor Jay Ritter of the University of Florida. Id. at 16 (citing Jay R.
Ritter,
IPO
Data,
U.
FLA.
WARRINGTON
C.
BUS.,
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/
[https://perma.cc/7WRNBGJM]). Ritter’s data includes many firms that are multi-class, but not
dual-class, so there is no wedge between the economic and voting interests
of insiders that have a class of shares different from the publicly listed class
of shares. See id. (explaining the use of Ritter’s data to construct their
sample). Second, their conclusions regarding valuation premiums rely on
measurements using Simple Q, rather than Total Q, and as they note in
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The risk of management agency costs can theoretically be
mitigated through greater equity ownership of the company
by the controller (i.e., forcing the controller to bear a greater
share of the costs of poor decisions) or subjecting management
to the market for corporate control. Concentrated ownership—
that is, control through ownership of a majority or other
controlling position of common equity—can be expected to
diminish management agency costs because the founder has
a pro rata equity stake and internalizes all of the costs and
benefits of management choices as much as other
shareholders do.116 This promotes more discipline regarding
management decisions and less incentive to pursue private
benefits of control.117

their paper, “the Total Q matched analysis favors dual class firms, and
suggests the dual class structure may not be detrimental at all.” Id. at 30.
A second recent financial paper also relies on Simple Q to come to
conclusions similar to those in Cremers, Lauterbach and Pajuste. See
Hyunseob Kim & Roni Michaely, Sticking Around Too Long? Dynamics of
the Benefits of Dual-Class Structures 4–5 (Jul. 15, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3145209
[http://perma.cc/G4S3-6NXU]. As a valuation measure, Total Q is superior
to Simple Q because it includes intangible assets in the denominator, which
are omitted from the denominator of the latter. See, e.g., Ryan H. Peters &
Lucian A. Taylor, Intangible Capital and the Investment-Q Relation, 123 J.
FIN. ECON. 251, 252–53 (2017). Tobin’s Q has, in any event, been seriously
questioned as a means of measuring the effect of corporate governance
changes on firm performance in both the financial and legal literature. See
Robert Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s Q 50 (Feb. 4, 2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3118020 [http://perma.cc/978S-7TAF]; Philip H. Dybvig &
Mitch Warachka, Tobin’s Q Does Not Measure Firm Performance: Theory,
Empirics and Alternatives 25 (Mar. 6, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1562444
[http://perma.cc/9B3Z-NVYM].
116 Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 591–93; see also Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312–13 (1976)
(stating that as an owner-manager’s equity interest in a company is
transferred to outside shareholders, agency costs increase).
117 Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 591–93; see also Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 116, at 312–13.
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Dual-class stock structures, on the other hand, increase
the risk of management agency costs, as controllers own less
of the cash-flow rights in the company compared to other
shareholders while retaining voting control. Dual-class
controllers have “less skin in the game” and internalize a
smaller portion of the costs of any mistakes they make in
management decisions. With a smaller equity stake, or
smaller claim to the cash flows of the company, the controller
absorbs a smaller fraction of the negative effects of her
decisions while continuing to capture the full private benefits
of control.118
Competition can also limit both management and control
agency costs as controllers are compelled to use corporate
resources for competitive advantage in the market rather
than personal gain or pet projects. 119 Competition can affect
both dual-class controllers and concentrated ownership
controllers.

C. The Current Debate: Prohibition vs. Private
Ordering
At present, the competing claims of founders and investors
for control of public companies in the United States have
created a polarized debate regarding dual-class stock
structures. Investor advocates argue that dual-class stock
structures should be prohibited or strictly limited in time.120

118
Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 113, at 602–04; Bebchuk et al.,
supra note 108, at 301.
119 See Gilson, supra note 11, at 1658 (noting that when competition in
the product market is sufficiently intense, the comparative advantage
between monitoring by a controlling shareholder and by market-based
monitoring converge); Mark J. Roe, Rents and their Corporate
Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1468–69, 1473 (2001).
120 The Council of Institutional Investors, for instance, recently
petitioned the New York Stock Exchange to require companies adopting
dual-class structures to include time-based sunset provisions. Letter from
Ash Williams, Chair, CII, Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, CII & Ken Bertsch,
Exec. Dir., CII, to Elizabeth King, Chief Regulatory Officer,
Intercontinential Exchange, Inc. (Oct. 24, 2018) [hereinafter “CII Letter to
NYSE”], https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/
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Founder advocates argue that the current system of private
ordering––through which founders choose their capital
structure and invite investors to invest or not––is fair and
efficient and should not be disturbed. 121 Thus, participants in
the U.S. capital markets are at loggerheads.

1. Calls for Prohibition
Institutional investors are pressing Nasdaq and the NYSE
to change the rules of the game by prohibiting dual-class share
structures altogether.122 They seek help from the exchanges
and the SEC, which oversees the exchanges’ activities,
because they do not like the results occurring in recent private
bargaining between the parties to initial public offerings.
Institutional investors suffer from a collective action problem
in opposing dual-class structures.
The problem is a version of the prisoner’s dilemma––
although, according to their anti-dual-class philosophy, all
investors would be better off if no investors invested in dualclass IPOs (because companies would be forced to adopt a one
share, one vote stock structure), no investor wants to be the
one left out if other investors invest in a dual-class company
that performs well in the market.123 Thus, it is difficult for
correspondence/2018/20181024%20NYSE%20Petition%20on%20Multiclass
%20Sunsets%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6GX-5R7Y].
121 See, e.g., The Continuing Support for Dual-Class Stock by
Companies and Investors, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (Oct.17,
2017), https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=
publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-dual-class-stock-1017.htm
[https://perma.cc/4ZZP-KYE9].
122 See CII Letter to NYSE, supra note 120. CII sent a similar letter to
Nasdaq. Letter from Ash Williams, Chair, CII, Jeff Mahoney, Gen.
Counsel, CII & Ken Bertsch, Exec. Dir., CII, to John Zecca, Senior Vice
President, Gen. Counsel N. Am. and Chief Regulatory Officer, Nasdaq
Stock Market (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_
advocacy/correspondence/2018/20181024%20NASDAQ%20Petition%20on
%20Multiclass%20Sunsets%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/WMK3-RBL8].
123 Andrew Winden & Andrew C. Baker, Dual-Class Index Exclusion
9–10 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper Series No. 233, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3201578
[https://perma.cc/GRX6-YTK6].
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institutional investors to pass up promising investments even
if they do not like the associated corporate governance
structures, particularly if their competitors are investing
despite any such dissatisfaction. For example, T. Rowe Price
quickly backed away from an initial challenge of the nonvoting dual-class structure adopted by Snapchat owners in
connection with its 2017 initial public offering.124
The Council of Institutional Investors has acknowledged
that competition for investment assets (such as retirement
accounts) among asset managers makes it difficult for them to
forgo investments in companies with dual-class share
structures.125 Corporate governance professionals employed
at institutional investors know that their portfolio managers
will refuse to sell (or not buy) the shares of successful
companies simply because the company adopted a dual-class
structure and refuses to collapse them into a single-class.126
In response to their collective action problem, institutional
investors want to establish “one share, one vote” as an
unshakeable bedrock principle of corporate governance––
even though state legislatures have not established such a
principle in state corporate laws. 127 In the absence of
124 Stephen Babcock, T. Rowe Price Backs off Challenge to Snapchat
IPO Plans, TECHNICAL.LY|BALT. (Jan. 20, 2017, 10:12 AM),
https://technical.ly/baltimore/2017/01/20/t-rowe-price-snapchat-ipo/
[https://perma.cc/VHQ4-WHGY]; Paresh Dave, Big Investor T. Rowe Price
Challenges Snapchat Founder’s Power, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017, 12:20
PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-snapchat-voting20170119-story.html [https://perma.cc/38ML-654V].
125 See Ken Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs,
Remarks to the SEC Investor Advisory Committee (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/video/webcast-archiveplayer.shtml?document_id=030917iac [https://perma.cc/7WXH-YNVK].
126 See, e.g., Matt Levine, ISS Tells Investors How They Want to Vote,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2018, 10:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
opinion/articles/2018-01-30/iss-tells-investors-how-they-want-to-vote
[https://perma.cc/G2QK-2N3W]; see also John Crabb, Blue Apron’s No-Vote
Shares IPO Concerns Investors, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (June 28, 2017),
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3728513/Blue-Aprons-no-vote-shares-IPOconcerns-investors.html [https://perma.cc/2SVA-BHBU].
127 See, e.g., CAL. STATE TEACHERS’ RET. SYS., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRINCIPLES
(2017),
http://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-
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statutory or regulatory prohibition, they directly lobby
companies to refrain from adopting dual-class structures or to
include strict time-based sunset provisions if they utilize
them.128
To bolster their calls for prohibition or extinction of dualclass share structures, institutional investors sometimes
argue that dual-class structures destroy corporate value.
However, the empirical record on that issue is decidedly
mixed. While a number of studies suggest that dual-class
firms perform poorly compared to single class firms, 129 other
studies suggest that a dual-class structure can enhance firm

attachments/corporate_governance_principles_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VXL7-BFZ3]; INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, ICGN
VIEWPOINT, DIFFERENTIAL SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES: MITIGATING
PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL AT THE EXPENSE OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
(2017),
https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/ICGN%20Viewpoint%20
differential%20share%20ownership_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/AE4X-NZ54];
Letter from Ann Yerger, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs, to Judith
C. McLevey, Vice President, Corp. Actions & Mkt. Watch, NYSE Euronext
(Dec. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Yerger Letter] (on file with the Columbia
Business Law Review).
128 See, e.g., Corporate Governance Principles for US Listed Companies,
supra note 9.
129 Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share-One Vote: The
Empirical Evidence, 12 REV. FIN. 51, 85 (2008) (finding some support in the
literature for the hypothesis that deviations from one share, one vote
adversely affect the value of non-control equity); Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii
& Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms
in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1084–85 (2010) (finding that
firm value increases with insiders’ cash-flow rights and decreases with
insiders’ voting rights); Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency
Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697, 1721–22 (2009); Scott
B. Smart, Ramabhadran S. Thirumalai & Chad J. Zutter, What’s in a Vote?
The Short- and Long-Run Impact of Dual-Class Equity on IPO Firm Values,
45 J. ACCT. & ECON. 94, 96 (2008); see also INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH
CTR. INST., CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD AND POOR’S 1500: A
TEN YEAR PERFORMANCE AND RISK REVIEW (2012) (finding that noncontrolled firms outperformed controlled firms over a ten-year period ended
August 31, 2012); KAMONJOH, supra note 15, at 10 (finding controlled
companies underperformed non-controlled firms over all periods reviewed
(one-, three-, five- and ten-year periods) with respect to total shareholder
returns, revenue growth, return on equity, and dividend payout ratios).
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value.130 One study concluded that founder-CEOs tend to
retire from management when the firms they establish
perform particularly well, and founder-CEOs have a positive
effect on firm performance.131 So it is hard to conclude that
founder control is clearly adverse to corporate value creation.

130 Ekkehart Böhmer, Gary C. Sanger & Sanjay B. Varshney, The
Effect of Consolidated Control on Firm Performance: The Case of Dual-Class
IPOs, in EMPIRICAL ISSUES IN RAISING EQUITY CAPITAL 95, 115 (Mario Levis
ed., 1996) (finding for a sample of ninety-eight dual-class IPOs that dualclass firms outperform their single-class counterparts matched for
exchange, offer date, industry and size in terms of stock-market returns as
well as accounting measures of firm performance); Thomas J. Chemmanur
& Yawen Jiao, Dual-Class IPOs: A Theoretical Analysis, 36 J. BANKING &
FIN. 305, 306 (2012) (creating a model predicting that dual-class IPO firms
are likely to outperform (underperform) single class IPO firms if the
reputation of the incumbent is high (low) and the firm is operating in an
industry where the difference in intrinsic values between the projects with
high and low near-term uncertainty is large (small));Valentin Dimitrov &
Prem C. Jain, Recapitalization of One Class of Common Stock into DualClass: Growth and Long-Run Stock Returns, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 342 (2006)
(finding a group of 178 firms that recapitalized from one-share one-vote into
a dual-class structure between 1979 and 1998 experienced, on average,
significant positive abnormal returns of 23.11% in a period of four years
following the announcement of the recap, with higher abnormal returns
accruing when additional equity is issued to grow the firm).
131 Renée Adams, Heitor Almeida & Daniel Ferreira, Understanding
the Relationship Between Founder-CEOs and Firm Performance, 16 J.
EMPIRICAL FIN. 136, 136 (2009) (finding that good performance makes it less
likely that the founder retains the CEO title and that, after factoring out
the effect of performance on founder-CEO status, there is a positive causal
effect of founder-CEOs on firm performance that is quantitatively larger
than the effect estimated through standard OLS regressions). Reid Hoffman
of LinkedIn comes to mind. In fact, he is on record saying that he brought
in an outside CEO because he knew he was not interested in the challenges
of managing process in a large firm. However, he retained voting control of
the company. Reid Hoffman, If, Why, and How Founders Should Hire a
“Professional”
CEO,
REIDHOFFMAN.ORG
(Jan.
21,
2013),
https://www.reidhoffman.org/if-why-and-how-founders-should-hire-aprofessional-ceo-2/ [https://perma.cc/LQ9B-C4HH]; Cromwell Schubarth,
Reid Hoffman: Why CEO Founders Should Stay and Why I Didn’t at
LinkedIn, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (Jan. 22, 2013, 1:44 P.M.),
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2013/01/22/reid-hoffman-whyceo-founders-should.html [https://perma.cc/4RMK-KL6S].
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2. Support for Private Ordering Status Quo
In the absence of specific stock exchange or other
regulatory requirements for dual-class capital structures,
such structures are currently adopted through private
ordering. That is, there is an implicit bargain regarding the
governance of the company being struck between the
entrepreneur and public investors at the time of an initial
public offering. The entrepreneur offers investors a right to a
pro rata share of the cash flows generated by the
entrepreneur’s enterprise in exchange for an investment of
capital and investors’ acceptance of the entrepreneur’s control
of the enterprise, subject to whatever limitations on that
control are incorporated into the charter of the company and
the underlying corporate law. Investors in a dual-class
company make a bet on the founder and the founder’s vision
for creating corporate value––hopefully generating abovemarket returns on investment.
In the private ordering model, which depends on
contractual freedom and market efficiency, investors and
entrepreneurs can adopt different combinations of cash flow
and control rights to balance entrepreneurs’ interests in
pursuing their idiosyncratic vision and investors’ desire for
protection from agency costs.132 The outcome of negotiations
regarding these combinations of rights depends on each
party’s relative bargaining power, and bargaining power
depends in part on market dynamics. When a large amount of
private capital is available and there is an insufficient supply
of good new business ideas, or when an entrepreneur has a
particularly compelling business idea or demonstrated ability
to build a business, the entrepreneur can get better terms,
including, in some cases, a dual-class stock structure.133 With
a less compelling business idea, particularly if private capital
for investment in start-ups is scarce, the entrepreneur will get
Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 585–86.
Id. (citing Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An
Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & ECON.
463, 493 (1996) (finding that venture capital’s use of covenants is related
to supply and demand in the venture-capital industry)).
132
133
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less favorable terms and may have to give up the dual-class
structure in order to go public or obtain sufficient capital to
grow the business.
Thus, it should not be a surprise that in the current
market, in which there is more capital than ideas and
talent,134 a significant number of entrepreneurs are able to
convince investors that they ought to be permitted to retain
control of their company following an initial public offering,
and investors are willing to invest in promising companies
despite their distaste for corporate governance features that
entrench the entrepreneur in control of the company. Indeed,
some of today’s dual-class companies (e.g., Alphabet,
Facebook) are among the most successful companies in the
world.135
Proponents of private ordering support their position by
noting that no one is forced to accept the founder’s terms for
investment––investors can always choose not to invest, and
the risks of agency costs created by the dual-class governance
model are priced into the IPO share price by the market,
which has the ability to assess and price such risks. 136 If we
134 See Will Gaybrick, Tech’s Ultimate Success: Software Developers Are
Now More Valuable to Companies than Money, CNBC (Sept. 6, 2018, 3:19
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/06/companies-worry-more-aboutaccess-to-software-developers-than-capital.html
[https://perma.cc/JP68UZNR].
135 See David J. Berger, Dual-Class Stock and Private Ordering: A
System that Works, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May
24, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05-24/dual-class-stockand-private-ordering-a-system-that-works/ [https://perma.cc/P23L-HDR7]
(arguing that the current private ordering system works and dual-class
arrangements are in part a response to short-termism in the financial
markets).
136 Stephen Bainbridge, Bebchuk and Kastiel’s Paternalistic Take on
Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 11, 2017),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2017/05/bebc
huk-and-kastiels-paternalistic-take-on-perpetual-dual-class-stock.html
[https://perma.cc/3GB7-NN9W]. But see, Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note
113, at 622 (arguing that while “IPO buyers might pay attention to and price
a salient feature like a dual-class structure, they might not similarly price
more subtle features, such as the presence and specifics of a sunset
provision.”).
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assume that markets are efficient, the governance structure
should be priced into the value and offering price of a company
at the time of its IPO. Thus, advocates of private ordering
argue that if the entrepreneur is willing to accept a lower
value for the company at the time of the IPO, and investors
are willing to purchase shares at the market price for a chance
to benefit from the entrepreneur’s vision, a fair bargain is
struck. Accordingly, investors should not seek voting rights
they have not paid for (with respect to existing dual-class
companies) or advocate for prohibition of a corporate
governance model that has been accepted by the market and
produced significant value for the world economy.
In the private ordering model, markets adjust for poor
management decisions by terminating managers or divesting.
In the case of dual-class companies, termination is not an
option for investors, since the entrepreneur controls the vote.
Thus, the only available response to mismanagement is exit,
which may or may not be an available option, depending on
the investor’s business model.137 Even where available,
selling shares may, in any event, only arise too late to avoid
the value destruction caused by entrepreneur-controllers who
are not effectively accountable to the market. Critics of the
current private ordering status quo conclude that rules
limiting the use of dual-class governance structures are

137 Institutional investors typically say that they are not able to “just
sell,” or do the “Wall Street Walk,” if they are dissatisfied with the
management of an entrepreneur-controller because they often invest in a
manner intended to follow the market or important indices such as the S&P
500, meaning they must own every company in the relevant index,
regardless of corporate governance structure and management decisions.
See, e.g., Yerger Letter, supra note 127 (stating that “[d]ue to their heavy
use of passive strategies, CII members are unable to exercise the ‘Wall
Street Walk’ and simply sell if they are dissatisfied”); see also Rakhi Kumar,
Managing Dir., Head of ESG Investments and Asset Stewardship, State St.
Glob. Advisors, Remarks to the SEC Investor Advisory Committee (Mar. 9,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/video/webcast-archiveplayer.shtml?document_id=030917iac [https://perma.cc/7WXH-YNVK].

2018.3_WINDEN_FINAL

No. 3:852]

SUNRISE, SUNSET

905

necessary to protect investors against such value
destruction.138
The next Section suggests that dual-class stock structures
can obtain enhanced legitimacy by focusing on the
fundamental goals of the parties to a corporate charter
agreement (their mutually ideal complete contract). The goal
of the founder is unimpeded pursuit of a vision of value
creation and the goals of investors are voice and influence on
management decisions. As explained in Part VII, there are
numerous ways in which dual-class stock structures can be
designed to satisfy both goals, making prohibition or strict
time limitation unnecessary.

D. Alternative Standards for Assessing Dual-Class
Stock Structures
In evaluating the terms of dual-class stock structures, it is
important to start at the beginning––the fundamental deal
struck between the buyers and sellers of such structures. As
noted above, the deal is a capital investment by investors in
exchange for a claim on some of the value created by the
entrepreneur’s vision. Where the entrepreneur is not
investing in the enterprise with other investors on a one-toone pro rata basis, investors are essentially making their
investment decision based only on their belief in the founder’s
vision and their desire to own a piece of it. 139 Because the
entrepreneur’s economic skin in the game is comparatively
low, the importance of the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic vision
is particularly high.
In light of this bargain between founders and investors, the
terms of the dual-class stock structure should be designed and
evaluated based on the extent to which they are necessary to
138 See, e.g., Blair A. Nicholas & Brandon Marsh, The Rising Tide of
Dual-Class Shares: Recipe for Executive Entrenchment, Underperformance,
and Erosion of Shareholder Rights, NAPPA REP., Apr. 2017, at 4 (“If the only
solution is for investors to abandon certain investments after dual-class
systems have done their damage, owners lose out financially and
discussions in corporate boardrooms and C-suites across the country will
suffer from a lack of diversity, perspective, and accountability.”).
139 See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 595 n.107.
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support the idiosyncratic vision for value creation held by the
founder, while minimizing the costs to investors. The
structure should give the founder unfettered discretion to
pursue the vision, but not more than necessary. The structure
should also protect investors by giving them some influence
over management, but not the ability to control over the
strategic direction of the company or election of its managers.
Particularly in the current market environment of
abundant capital chasing a limited number of visions for value
creation, a system that provides entrepreneurs too little
protection may discourage or prevent them from pursuing
visions that could create significant value, leading to a loss for
society. Conversely, a system that gives entrepreneurs too
much protection may lead to unacceptable levels of
management agency costs through value destroying, goodfaith management mistakes regarding asset allocation, even
if no conflicted or otherwise self-aggrandizing aggregations of
pecuniary private benefits of control are present.140
On the other hand, if institutional investors are successful
in their campaign to abolish dual-class structures or to impose
strict time-based sunsets on them, the result may very well be
an acceleration of business trends that are already emerging
in the United States. More companies would stay private
longer, leading to diminished opportunities for investment by
retail investors and less publicly available information about
the most vibrant engines of growth in the economy. Why go
public and lose control of your company when you can get the
capital you need to grow in the private markets, retain control
140 It is also possible that in some cases entrepreneur-controllers make
poor corporate management decisions based on the pursuit of non-pecuniary
private benefits of control. Entrepreneur-controllers may, for instance,
make business decisions based on pride, fame or personal satisfaction, see
Alessio M. Pacces, Control Matters: Law and Economics of Private Benefits
of Control 5–6 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
131/2009, 2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1448164 [https://perma.cc/R47D-XZJW] (explaining how idiosyncratic nonpecuniary private benefits of control affect business decisions), or enter into
businesses they do not know well but find personally alluring. See Kobi
Kastiel, Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled Companies,
2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 60, 118–19 (2016).
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and avoid the harsh spotlight of public disclosure of your
business activities and results of operations? Private ordering
may permit some inefficient results, but prohibition or
significant limitation of dual-class structures could have
adverse
macro-economic
effects
by
discouraging
entrepreneurs from going public and growing their
enterprises using the additional capital available in public
markets.
Entrepreneurs often face a trade-off between acquiring
additional capital to grow their firms and retaining control
over the enterprise they have created.141 If entrepreneurs are
able to convince private or public investment markets that
they have sufficiently compelling idiosyncratic visions for
value creation and that they deserve protection from
termination through the creation of dual-class share
structures, they can pursue the growth of their firms without
fear of losing control over them. If entrepreneurs are
prohibited from relying on dual-class structures to enhance
their voting strength even as their economic interest in their
firm declines, they may choose not to seek value-enhancing
capital infusions lest they lose control of their vision. Noam
Wasserman has shown that entrepreneurs sometimes choose
not to grow their companies if they fear seeking the capital
necessary to grow will cause them to lose control. 142 For
example, in his recent autobiography, Phil Knight suggested
that he would not have been willing to take Nike public
without the right to retain control of the board.143 Nasdaq
141 See Noam Wasserman, The Throne Vs. the Kingdom: Founder
Control and Value Creation in Startups, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 255, 256
(2017) (arguing “founders face a ‘control dilemma’ in which a startup’s
resource dependence drives a wedge between the startup’s value and the
founder’s ability to retain control of decision making” and finding that in a
unique data set of 6130 U.S. startups, those in which the founder is still in
control of the board of directors and/or the CEO position are significantly
less valuable than those in which the founder has given up control, with
each additional level of founder control (i.e., controlling the board and/or the
CEO position) reducing the pre-money valuation of the startup by 17.1%–
22.0%, on average).
142 See Wasserman, supra note 103, at 108.
143 PHIL KNIGHT, SHOE DOG 329–30 (2016).
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recently issued a report on market reforms––in an effort to
reverse the U.S. trend of fewer and fewer public companies––
in which it voiced support for dual-class stock structures that
offer founders flexibility in making the decision to go public.144
Goshen and Hamdani argue that entrepreneurs should be
permitted to contract with investors for uncontestable control
in order to pursue their idiosyncratic visions.145 Thereafter,
the entrepreneur-controller’s right to make management
decisions should be afforded property-rule protection––that is,
it should only be taken away with the owner’s consent.146 The
uncontestable and (most often) indefinite control an
entrepreneur has in a dual-class context provides the
entrepreneur with the maximum ability to realize her
idiosyncratic vision, which can benefit both the entrepreneur
and her investors. However, the entrepreneur’s smaller equity
claim as compared to concentrated ownership leaves investors
with relatively high exposure to agency costs.147
Because of this relatively high risk, investors have a
particularly acute need for a voice––a means to hold
management accountable––in the context of dual-class
companies. The heart of the challenge in resolving the contest
for control between entrepreneurs and institutional investors
is finding a way to protect investors from management agency
costs––essentially, the prospect of poor management decisions
made by a manger with uncontested discretion. A welldesigned package of dual-class sunrise and sunset provisions
144 NASDAQ, THE PROMISE OF MARKET REFORM: REIGNITING AMERICA’S
ECONOMIC ENGINE 17 (2018) (“One of America’s greatest strengths is that
we are a magnet for entrepreneurship and innovation. Central to
cultivating this strength is establishing multiple paths entrepreneurs can
take to public markets. Each publicly-traded company should have
flexibility to determine a class structure that is most appropriate and
beneficial for them, so long as this structure is transparent and disclosed
up-front so that investors have complete visibility into the company. Dualclass structures allow investors to invest side-by-side with innovators and
high growth companies, enjoying the financial benefits of these companies’
success.”).
145 Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 598–99.
146 Id. at 601.
147 Id. at 590–91.
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will give entrepreneurs the security and discretion they seek
while protecting investors from the risk of material value
destruction through poor decisions by offering investors a
means to influence the entrepreneur’s decisions, if not to
interfere with them.
Thus, in evaluating the terms of dual-class stock
structures, the parties should ask the following questions:
Does the term support pursuit of the entrepreneur’s
idiosyncratic vision? Does the term contemplate a means for
investors to influence management? Is the term necessary to
avoid agency costs? Is there a less restrictive means to avoid
agency costs? Through an examination of these questions, it
is possible to provide investors with more protection from
agency costs than they typically have in current dual-class
stock structures but without prohibiting or severely limiting
the use of such capital structures to promote the pursuit of
entrepreneurial visions for value creation. In fact, as
discussed in Part VII, there are multiple different approaches
that could be used to protect investors more effectively
without prohibition or time-limitation of the structures.

VII. DESIGNING OPTIMAL DUAL-CLASS
STRUCTURES
A. Summary
The genius of American corporate law is its flexibility. The
survey of dual-class sunrise and sunset structures in Parts II
and III above show that there are many ways to approach a
dual-class share structure and it should be possible to design
multiple different structures that meet the needs of both
entrepreneurs and investors. Prohibition and strict timebased limitation are neither necessary nor appropriate given
the plethora of other alternatives, even if one is not
comfortable with the status quo result arising from
unrestricted private ordering.
The optimal dual-class capital structure will be driven by
the characteristics of a given situation and should be
negotiated among the parties prior to an initial public offering
considering the nature of the company and its vision, the
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strength of the vision, the personal qualities of the
entrepreneur, the industry of the company, the capital profile
and spending requirements of the company, the availability of
alternatives to going public, and any other factors deemed
material by the parties. 148 One size does not fit all, and
allowing the market to decide the terms of control for each
company should, in aggregate, result in the best allocation of
resources to means of productivity and division of control
between entrepreneurs and investors. 149
The optimal structure will typically arise from an
appropriate mix of sunrise and sunset provisions. If the
founder insists on issuing only no vote shares to public
investors, a time-based sunset may be appropriate, so the
148 As noted supra Part V, a company typically has a capital structure
in place before filing a registration statement with the SEC, launching the
deal, and embarking upon the “road show” marketing tour in which it
pitches the deal to investors. However, the initial public offering
underwriting process provides an excellent forum in which founders, their
counsel, their bankers, and investors can assess the merits of a dual-class
structure. Investment bankers often organize “testing the waters” meetings
between founder/CEOs and potential investors prior to filing a registration
statement, which provide an opportunity to determine which entrepreneurs
have idiosyncratic visions that merit dual-class protection and which do not,
as well as the details of the dual-class structure for each company. See, e.g.,
Ned Welsh, Testing the Waters, MOFOJUMPSTARTER.COM (Mar. 11,
2014),
https://www.mofojumpstarter.com/2014/03/11/testing-the-waters/
[https://perma.cc/G3JS-JN8J].
149 Ronald Gilson, Evaluating Dual-Class Common Stock: The
Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 828 n.56 (1987) (the market
mechanism allows beneficial recapitalizations and financings to continue
while deterring transactions that tend to disenfranchise and transfer
wealth from public shareholders to insiders without appropriate
compensation); Martin Lipton, New Theory in Corporate Governance
Undermines Theories Relied on by Proponents of Short-Termism and
Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Nov. 25, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/11/25/new-theory-incorporate-governance-undermines-theories-relied-on-by-proponents-ofshort-termism-and-shareholder-activism/
[https://perma.cc/JAD5-J2H4]
(referring to Goshen and Squire’s Principal Costs, and noting that the
division of control between managers and investors that minimizes the sum
of principal costs and agent costs is firm-specific, driven by factors such as
industry, business strategy and personal characteristics of the manager and
investors).
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period in which investors have no voice is limited. If public
investors have the right to elect a minority of the directors on
the board, the nature of the sunset provisions will be less
important since investors have a significant avenue for input
on and review of management decisions, including strategies
that could lead to a diminution in corporate value, leading to
management agency costs.
If a dual-class company adopts a minority director election
provision, the nature of the voting and sunset provisions will
be less important, but still offer opportunities for tailoring in
light of the lessons of idiosyncratic vision theory. Generally,
voting shares will be preferable to non-voting shares due to
the lack of accountability and shareholder voice associated
with non-voting shares. The precise ratio of high to low voting
shares is less important, but a higher ratio is a preferable
means to manage the founder’s concerns about dilution over
time, since it preserves a voice for shareholders in the
company.
With respect to sunset provisions, time-based sunsets and
dilution sunsets are generally inconsistent with supporting
the realization of an idiosyncratic vision for value creation and
should generally be avoided. Divestment, death, and
separation sunsets are consistent with supporting an
entrepreneurial vision for value creation, and should
generally be included in the structure for dual-class
companies. Other sunsets that put pressure on founders to
focus on the efficient realization of their value enhancing
vision without arbitrary or dis-incentivizing limitations
include fiduciary and performance sunsets, which penalize
founders for fiduciary breaches and failure to meet
performance expectations.150
The terms of a dual-class structure should accurately
reflect the quality of a founder’s idiosyncratic vision for
creating above market returns, including the nature of the
business, the position of the company in the market, and the
talent of the company’s management. There is significant

150 This author is not aware of any companies that have instituted such
sunset provisions to date.
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room for flexibility within the dual-class structure to give
some founders a greater benefit of the doubt (or a longer leash)
than others in designing the structure. In a situation where a
founder insists on a dual-class structure despite a dubious
business model or lackluster talent, it may in fact be
appropriate to include a time-based sunset provision,
although as a theoretical matter it is still preferable to utilize
a less arbitrary sunset tied to performance expectations or
failures.

B. Sunrise Provisions
1. Voting Structure
Issuing only non-voting shares to public investors is a
suboptimal approach to retaining founder control of a public
company. While issuing non-voting stock to the public allows
founders to improve the value of their company by using
equity to raise capital, incentivize employees, and acquire
accretive businesses without fear of losing control, there are
numerous drawbacks to listing only non-voting shares. The
shareholders’ voice becomes extremely attenuated when
management has no obligation to submit any matters to a vote
of the public shareholders. SEC Rule 14a-8 under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which monitors the
shareholder proposal process, is premised on shareholders
holding voter shares.151 The SEC’s say-on-pay voting
requirement arguably applies under Rule 14a-21 only when a
company is soliciting votes from shareholders for election of
directors at an annual meeting pursuant to a Schedule 14A
proxy statement.152 If no public shareholder vote is required
because the issuer has only non-voting shares listed, the
issuer would use Schedule 14C, the proxy form used for
annual meetings at which no vote of the public shareholders
will take place, and Rule 14a-21 would not apply.153 As a
result, investors will effectively have no measurable voice, and
151
152
153

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8 (2018).
Id. § 240.14a–101; id. § 240.14a–21.
Id. § 240.14c–101.
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management will have little incentive to listen to their
concerns about the direction of the company’s strategy. The
absence of investor voice is ultimately an issue of
accountability.154
Listing both voting and non-voting shares is less
worrisome than listing only non-voting shares, because as
long as there is a voting class of common equity listed, the
accountability issues described above will be ameliorated.
Some dual-class companies have taken this approach.155
Another alternative to listing non-voting shares in an initial
public offering is listing low voting shares but authorizing the
issuance of future non-voting shares, if necessary, in the IPO
charter.156 In that case, public shareholders have arguably
154 Anne Simpson of CalPERS, a member of the SEC’s Investor
Advisory Committee, stated at the Committee’s March 9, 2017 hearing on
Unequal Voting Rights of Common Stock that shareholders ceding power
without accountability is the primary problem with non-voting shares
specifically and dual-class share structures more generally. Anne Simpson,
Remarks to the SEC Investor Advisory Committee (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/video/webcast-archiveplayer.shtml?document_id=030917iac [https://perma.cc/7WXH-YNVK].
155 See, e.g., Alphabet, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000165204417000008/go
og10-kq42016.htm [https://perma.cc/X4WK-SEZB]; Brown-Forman Co.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K) (June 16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/14693/000001469316000160/bfb-2016430x10k.htm
[https://perma.cc/9FQK-HJE6]; CBS Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb.
16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/813828/000081382816
000065/cbs_10k-123115.htm
[https://perma.cc/PZ27-5UK9]; Discovery
Comm’n, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1437107/000143710718000028/di
sca-2017123110k.htm [https://perma.cc/LSS2-7H7Y]; Under Armour, Inc.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1336917/000133691717000017/ua-20161231x10k.htm
[https://perma.cc/BPN2-9EP9]; Viacom, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K)
(Nov.
12,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1339947/
000133994715000042/via2015093010k.htm [https://perma.cc/5JD7-YPYR].
See also Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review).
156 This is the approach taken by Blue Apron, Inc. in its recent IPO. See
Blue Apron, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S-1/A)
(June
19,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1701114/
000104746917004085/a2232430zs-1a.htm [https://perma.cc/R8AD-TPBN].
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agreed to such future issuances in agreeing to invest at the
time of the initial public offering. Assuming adequate
disclosure and risk factors regarding the possibility of offering
non-voting shares in the future, it would not be necessary to
make any payments to the public shareholders in connection
with future issuances of the non-voting shares. As a practical
matter, no later approval of a charter amendment by
shareholders—the issue that became a challenge for
Facebook—would be necessary. Furthermore, as a policy
matter, any issuance would not constitute the kind of midcourse correction requiring restitution discussed by Goshen
and Hamdani.157
Another alternative to listing non-voting shares is a
change in the ratio of votes between the high and low voting
shares to ensure that future issuances of low voting shares for
compensation, capital raising, and acquisition purposes do not
dilute founders out of their control position in the company.
There are no rules that require the ratio to be 10:1. As noted
in Part III, supra, although 10:1 is the overwhelmingly most
common ratio, there are some companies with other ratios. A
founder concerned about losing control through future equity
issuances can establish an initial ratio that is more
impervious to dilution, such as 50:1 or 100:1.

2. Minority Directors
A large number of companies that adopted dual-class
structures from the mid-70s to the mid-80s, when the NYSE
refused to list companies with a dual-class structure, did so
through the AMEX, which had rules requiring that minority
shareholders have the power to elect a minority of the board
of directors.158
This option may be the best compromise between
entrepreneurs’ desire for management discretion and
investors’ desire for protection from poor management
decisions. If investors are not able to rely on market discipline
See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 608–10.
Seligman, supra note 23, at 703. Nike is a striking example of a
company that continues to operate on this basis.
157
158
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or bundling of control and cash flow rights to ameliorate the
risks of management agency costs, giving investors one or
more representatives on the board of directors is an important
concession that can give investors a voice and mitigate the
risk of such agency costs.
The introduction of minority director elections may work
better for entrepreneur-controllers than time-based sunset
provisions that might trigger before the entrepreneurcontroller’s idiosyncratic vision for value creation is
completely achieved. On the other hand, with the introduction
of minority director elections, investors have an advocate in
the boardroom. This may make it more difficult for
entrepreneur-controllers to engage in long-term large-scale
investments of corporate assets in losing propositions,
particularly those that are based more on personal allure
(non-pecuniary private benefits of control) than realistic
visions for enhancing corporate value.
To be effective, this right should be coupled with proxy
access and a clear right to nominate the minority directors.
There is a significant likelihood that candidates nominated by
a board elected by the founder will not be sufficiently
independent to give minority investors a true voice in board
deliberations. Accordingly, it is important that the minority
investors’ right to elect a certain percentage of the board be
coupled with a right to nominate an equivalent number of
directors and have those nominees included in the corporate
proxy for consideration by shareholders along with other
director nominees.
Management agency costs can be mitigated through an
effective mechanism to allow public investors to nominate and
elect a minority of the directors to the board. One or more
truly independent representatives of the public investors can
voice concerns about the amount or nature of capital
investments or research and development expenses being
devoted to particular projects of the company. Additionally,
they can also voice concerns about the wisdom of an
acquisition or the proposed price. At the end of the day, the
founder will control the board and be able to obtain support
for decisions that are consistent with the founder’s

2018.3_WINDEN_FINAL

916

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2018

idiosyncratic vision for value creation. However, the founder
will also benefit from truly independent alternative
perspectives provided by genuine representatives of the public
investors.
Of course, introducing investor representatives to the
board of directors is not without risks. Dual-class companies
permitting public investors to elect a minority of the board are
necessarily more vulnerable to activist investors, who can
seek to place representatives in those seats, and, in fact, are
targeted by activist investors twice as much as dual-class
companies without such minority director representation.159
Activist investors have used this access to force some dualclass companies to collapse their capital structures into a
single class.160

C. Sunset Provisions
1. Time-Based Sunsets
In light of concerns about the risk of founder vision atrophy
and increased agency costs over time, Bebchuk and Kastiel
have argued, in their article The Untenable Case for Perpetual
Dual-class Stock, that if dual-class stock structures are not
abolished, they should at least be required to include a time-

159 See Kastiel, supra note 140, at 95 (noting a sample of 193 dual-class
firms shows that forty-three percent of all dual-class firms that grant public
investors rights to elect a minority of directors experienced at least one
activist event over a ten-year period from 2005 to 2014 as compared to
twenty percent of all dual-class firms without such a structure).
160 Hubbell Incorporated reclassified into a single class of common
stock in December, 2015. See Hubbell Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec.
23,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/48898/000
119312515412174/d110573d8k.htm
[https://perma.cc/494J-FNA6]; Ed
Hammond & Stephen Foley, Falcone Targets Dual-Class Share Hurdle, FIN.
TIMES (June 25, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/6b5f1726-fb99-11e3aa19-00144feab7de (on file with The Columbia Business Law Review);
Update: Hubbell-Change in Trustee to Hubbell Family Trusts Has Moved
Class A Shares from Steep Discount to Premium, SEEKING A LPHA (July 28,
2014, 3:59 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/2349235-update-hubbellchange-in-trustee-to-hubbell-family-trusts-has-moved-class-a-shares-fromsteep-discount-to-premium [https://perma.cc/5HT2-YJT3].
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based sunset provision that is renewable at the discretion of
the common stockholders.161 Their concerns may be bolstered
by recent financial studies suggesting the value of dual-class
stock structures declines over time.162
Despite this, time-based sunsets generally are not part of
an optimal set of sunset provisions. The time-based sunsets
currently in use are effectively arbitrary—they do not appear
to be related in any way to the achievement or failure of any
aspect of an entrepreneur-controller’s idiosyncratic vision,
short- or long-term performance, or value metrics.163 While it
might be possible to estimate how long it ought to take to
realize the value of the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic vision,
any such estimate, which may or may not be correct, is just
that—an estimate. Sunset provisions reliant on estimates of
how much discretion an entrepreneur needs are inconsistent
with Goshen and Hamdani’s idea that the entrepreneur
should have a property right in control for purposes of
pursuing an idiosyncratic vision and should not be forced to
give up control without consent. 164 Time-based sunsets are
hostile to entrepreneurial discretion and reflect a strict view
that the entrepreneur-controller’s control of the company
should simply end at some pre-determined time in the future.
When insisting on a time-based sunset provision,
shareholders are essentially telling the entrepreneurcontroller, “You only get X years. That’s it.” That is a blunt
instrument, not calibrated to resolve the tension between the
entrepreneur’s desire for protection from interference or
termination and the investors’ desire for protection from poor
management decisions that may or may not occur.

See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 113, at 617–21.
See supra note 115.
163 In terms of stock price performance among companies that have
incorporated a time-based sunset provision in their charter, five
experienced precipitous stock price declines post-IPO, seven experienced
significant stock price gains following their IPO, and four meandered
around their IPO price. Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on
file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
164 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
161
162
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One argument Bebchuk and Kastiel make in favor of timebased sunsets is that they are similar to the lifespans of
private equity funds165—another situation in which investors
give the managers of their investment’s significant discretion
regarding asset allocation with little or no ability to influence
the choice of manager over time. As noted above, a plurality
of the time-based sunsets observed in this data set were set at
the seventh anniversary of the listing of the company, while a
few were set at ten years. This period is similar to the
lifespans of private equity funds, which tend to be around ten
years.166 Bebchuk and Kastiel suggest that the limited life of
private equity funds represents an implicit understanding
that the advantages of superior business leadership acumen
tend to fade with time.167
In the case of private funds, however, investors are
typically locked into the investment for the life of the fund,
with few exceptions allowing early redemptions.168 On the
other hand, investors in a public company with a dual-class
structure are legally free to sell their positions in highly liquid
markets at any time.169 They can vote with their feet if they
no longer believe in the idiosyncratic vision of an
entrepreneur-controller. Furthermore, investors in private
equity funds do not typically gain the power to replace the
asset manager at the end of the fund’s life. Instead, they are
allowed to withdraw their capital and invest it elsewhere—a

Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 113, at 605–06.
Id.
167 See Id. at 606. This conclusion is questionable. While it may be true
that investors prefer not to place their investment with a particular asset
manager for an indefinite period, the life spans of private equity funds may
be more related to the expected period required to source investments and
achieve improvements in the businesses of the invested companies than to
an understanding that the asset manager’s ability may fade over time.
168 Addison D. Braendel & Seth Chertok, Closed-End Private Equity
Funds: A Detailed Overview of Fund Business Terms, Part II, 13 J. PRIV.
EQUITY 57, 60 (2010).
169 Index funds and asset managers mimicking them are a practical
exception, though in terms of their legal rights there are no limits to
divestment. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
165
166
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right that investors in public dual-class companies have at all
times.
Investors in public dual-class companies also have
significantly greater protections than investors in private
equity or other investment funds. They are protected by
fiduciary duties, generally have a voice in the management of
the company (however small it may be), and have access to
much more information about the company with which to
make informed investment decisions. The managers of private
investment funds are able to contract out of their fiduciary
duties to fund investors and frequently do. 170 By contrast, the
managers and controlling stockholders of public companies,
including companies with a dual-class structure, are subject
to significant fiduciary duties to minority shareholders as
directors, officers, and controlling shareholders.171 As public
companies with shares registered with the SEC, they also
have significantly greater disclosure obligations regarding
their results of operations and business trends.172 Thus,
investors in private equity and venture capital funds have far
fewer protections than investors in public dual-class
companies, and the lifespans for such funds do not necessarily

See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2005) (permitting expansion,
restriction, or elimination of fiduciary duties in limited partnerships); Id. §
18-1101(c) (2005) (same in limited liability companies); Lloyd L. Drury III,
Publicly-Held Private Equity Firms and The Rejection of Law as a
Governance Device, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 57 (2013); Mohsen Manesh, What is
the Practical Importance of Default Rules Under Delaware LLC and LP
Law?, HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 121, 121–22 (2012); Yves Smith,
Presentation Shows Private Equity Investors Knowingly Sign Contracts with
Waivers of Fiduciary Duty, Other Terms Stacked Against Them,
NAKEDCAPITALISM.COM (Apr., 2 2015), https://www.nakedcapitalism.com
/2015/04/presentation-shows-private-equity-investors-knowingly-signcontracts-waivers-fiduciary-duty-terms-stacked.html
[https://perma.cc/8ENP-F58D].
171 These obligations are summarized in the American Law Institute’s
Principles of Corporate Governance. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, pts. IV & V (AM. LAW
INST. 1994).
172 Compare Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2018) with Use of
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.500 et. seq. (2018).
170
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justify a similarly limited period of managerial discretion for
the entrepreneur-controllers of dual-class companies.
Another argument for time-based sunsets is that
entrepreneur-controllers have incentives to retain control
even when it would be more economically efficient to unify the
capital structure or sell control. Bebchuk and Kastiel explain
that because controllers gain only a fraction of the efficiency
benefits associated with eliminating inefficient dual-class
structures, despite giving up all of their private benefits of
control, efficient sales or unifications may not take place in a
substantial range of situations in which the entrepreneurcontroller’s management of the company has become
inefficient.173 With a smaller fraction of equity capital owned
by the controller and a larger amount of the private benefits
of control, the controller has an incentive to refuse a wider
range of efficient sales or unifications. Bebchuk and Kastiel
do not suggest that sales and unifications will never occur––
transactions with sufficient value to overcome the controller’s
disincentives will still occur. The implication, however, is that
some inefficient dual-class companies persist in business
longer than they should, and steps should be taken to prevent
this through time-based sunset provisions.174
While some inefficient dual-class companies might be
eliminated through mandatory time-based sunsets, efficient
companies would also be lost. The historical record suggests
that such drastic measures are not necessary to encourage the
unification or sale of dual-class companies. Only six of
nineteen companies included in Jeffrey Gordon’s 1988 study175
of companies adopting dual-class stock structures as takeover
defense mechanisms are still listed. Of those, three have
adopted tenure voting, one has collapsed its dual-class
structure, and only two remain dual-class companies.176 The
Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 113, at 613–18.
Bebchuk and Kastiel note that the ISS study cited supra, note 15
concludes that dual-class companies tend to last twice as long as controlled
companies with a single class of shares. Id. at 617.
175 See Gordon, supra note 28.
176 Among the companies in Gordon’s study that remain public, only
one still has a dual-class stock structure with unequal voting: The Hershey
173
174
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remainder have been acquired or gone bankrupt. Similarly,
only eight of forty-three companies included in Partch’s 1987
study177 of firms that adopted dual-class structures between
1961 and 1984 remain listed dual-class companies, most of
which are included in this dual-class data set.178
More recently, the founders of several of the companies in
the data set have voluntarily collapsed their dual-class stock
or sold the company in recent years. The founders of Nu Skin
Enterprises, for example, voluntarily converted all of their
high vote shares in 2003. The controlling families of Forest
City Enterprises and Hubbell Incorporated agreed with
investor demands to collapse their dual-class structures. The
founders of Apollo Education Group (owner of University of
Phoenix), Cablevision, Kayak Software, Molex, and zulily sold
their companies between 2013 and 2017.
It is clear companies with dual-class capital structures are
not impervious to change. Ronald Gilson explained in 2006
why dual-class share structures fail to persist in intergenerational contexts:
“[p]recisely because non-pecuniary private benefits
are idiosyncratic to the particular controlling
shareholder and because the identities of controlling
shareholders change with generations, it is plausible
to expect changes in the value of the non-pecuniary
private benefits of control over time . . . [a]t some
point, the wealth gain from adaptation reflected in a
large acquisition premium, or an increase in market
value from giving up control and hiring professional

Company. Two companies have converted from dual-class to single-class
stock structures: The Gap, Inc. and Lee Enterprises. Three companies,
American Family, now AFLAC, Inc., Carlisle Companies Incorporated and
The J.M. Smucker Company have a tenure stock structure. See id. at 79–
85.
177 See Partch, supra note 28.
178 The remaining companies include Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc., Bowl
America Incorporated, The Hershey Company, Kelly Services, Inc., Moog,
Inc., A. O. Smith Corporation, Watsco, Inc., and John Wiley & Sons, Inc. See
Partch, supra note 28, at 334–38 tbl.6.
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managers, outweighs the non-pecuniary private
benefits of control . . . .”179

Gilson’s final point applies equally to single generation
controllers, however. When dual-class controllers conclude
that returns from the dual-class structure are no longer
attractive—that is, when their visions have run their course
and are no longer producing the results the controllers
anticipated—they convert their shares to low vote common
shares or sell the company.
Finally, in some cases it is possible to persuade a
controlling founder to step-down from leadership if that is in
the best interests of the company––even if the founder
controls elections of the directors. The most high-profile recent
example of a controlling founder stepping away from
leadership was Travis Kalanick’s resignation as the CEO of
Uber after being pressured by shareholders to resign.180
These historic results suggest that it is not necessary to
resort to time-based sunsets to terminate dual-class share
structures despite controller incentives to avoid sales and
unifications. Controllers can be and often are persuaded to
unify their capital structures or sell their companies. Since
time-based sunsets do not protect the idiosyncratic vision of
founders and are not, when other methods are available,
necessary to protect investors from economic inefficiencies,
they generally will not be part of an optimal dual-class
structure.

2. Dilution and Divestment Sunsets
Dilution sunsets must be carefully crafted to serve as part
of an optimal package of sunset provisions. They could
diminish the creation of corporate value by discouraging
179 Gilson, supra note 11, at 1670–71 (predicting that controlling
shareholder systems in “good law” countries tend to deteriorate simply from
the gravity of generations and providing evidence from Sweden).
180 Katie Benner, Silicon Valley Investors Flexed Their Muscles in Uber
Fight, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/06/21/technology/silicon-valley-investors-flexed-their-muscles-in-uberfight.html [https://perma.cc/472J-YE25].
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entrepreneur-controllers from issuing additional shares to
obtain capital for growth, incentivize new employees, or
acquire complementary businesses. 181 As noted supra,
Wasserman has documented that entrepreneurs sometimes
choose not to take on additional capital in the venture capital
stages of growth for fear of losing control of their company.182
One of the costs of becoming a controlling shareholder is
typically a lower level of investment diversification—the
controlling stockholder is typically required to invest a
significant percentage of the controller’s assets in the
controlled corporation—which acts as a natural disincentive
to making poor investments of the controlled corporation’s
assets in a manner that adversely affects the value of the
company.
Under the idiosyncratic value theory, the reasons for an
entrepreneur’s dilution matter. If the entrepreneur’s stake is
diluted by additional accretive issuances of equity to grow the
company and realize the above-market returns inherent in the
entrepreneur’s vision, the entrepreneur should not be
penalized through loss of control. If the entrepreneur is
diluted because the entrepreneur is selling interests in the
corporation in order to diversify investments, that indicates a
lower level of commitment to the idiosyncratic vision
embodied by the corporation. Thus, divestment sunsets are a
better trigger for high vote conversion than dilution sunsets.
When utilized, divestment sunsets should attempt to quantify
the point where the entrepreneur’s choice to diversify
investments through the sale of interests in the company
indicates an insufficient remaining commitment to the
181 Banerjee and Masulis have explained that controlling shareholders
may forgo positive net present value (“NPV”) investments to maintain
control unless they benefit from a dual-class share structure. They note that
when the NPV of projects that would otherwise have been forgone is higher
than the takeover premium that would be available to shareholders in an
unimpeded market for control of the corporation, dual-class structures
enhance shareholder welfare. Suman Banerjee & Ronald W. Masulis,
Ownership, Investment and Governance: The Costs and Benefits of Dual
Class Shares (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
352/2013, 2017).
182 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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enterprise. At that point, the entrepreneur should lose control
of the company. Alternatively, companies could use formulas
to focus on the reasons for dilution and only penalize the
entrepreneur-controller for divestment. The Snap charter
does this—focusing on the founder’s ongoing ownership of
high vote shares as a percentage of the number owned at the
time of its IPO.183

3. Death and Incapacity Sunsets
Death and incapacity sunsets should be included in all
dual-class charters. The death or incapacity of the founder
should collapse the capital structure because the founder is no
longer able to pursue an idiosyncratic vision upon death or
incapacity. One possible exception is when there are multiple
co-founders, where the high vote shares could be transferred
to a co-founder, with the capital structure collapsing upon the
death or incapacity of the last surviving founder. Another
possible exception is when employees imbued with the
idiosyncratic vision of the founder and in a position to carry it
on hold enough high vote shares to make a material difference
in corporate voting going forward. In that case, the employees
should arguably be permitted to retain their control block
until their own deaths, or as long as they remain employed.
The death and incapacity provisions should apply to shares
held by permitted transferees of the original shareholders as
well as directly by the natural person. This ensures that there
are no lingering high vote shares being voted by someone
beyond the death or incapacity of the relevant original holder
of high vote shares.
One important purpose of death sunsets is to prevent the
intergenerational passage of founder control to descendants.
Investors in founder-controlled enterprises make an implicit
bargain with the founder at the time of the initial public
offering that the investors will grant the founder control of the
enterprise (subject to certain conditions, or not) in exchange
Snap, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 2, 2017),
exhibit 3.1, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1564408/000
119312517029199/d270216dex31.htm[https://perma.cc/9UKF-MCDG].
183
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for an equity stake in the enterprise. Essentially, investors are
betting on the founder. They are willing to take the risk that
the founder’s vision or management abilities may fail because
they believe in the founder’s vision and capabilities, which is
typically demonstrated by the pre-public performance of the
company and forecasts for its future performance.
Under purely free market principles, founders should have
an opportunity to offer investors shares in a company that
permits intergenerational transfers of control, and investors
can be held to that bargain when the founder dies. The
founder is conditioning participation in the above-market
returns produced by the founder’s enterprise on acceptance of
the founder’s descendants managing the company after the
founder’s death. But that bargain is not justified by the need
to protect the pursuit of the founder’s vision for corporate
value. Instead, from a macroeconomic perspective, the
bargain may lead to an unfortunate waste of economic
resources. Each generation of individuals is likely to have
different visions and capabilities. Studies have suggested that
the performance benefits of founder control recede in
succeeding generations.184 While it is conceivable that new
generations of the founding family, or managers and
employees who have worked with the founder for many years,
would have the same or similar idiosyncratic vision as the
founder, when investing in a founder-led company, investors
are investing in the vision of the founder and, sometimes, her
184 Morten Bennedsen, Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Francisco PerezGonzalez & Daniel Wolfenzon, Inside the Family Firm: The Role of Families
in Succession Decisions and Performance, 122 Q.J. ECON. 647, 669–670, 684
(2007); Gilson, supra note 11, at 1661, 1668; Kastiel, supra note 140, at 118;
Randall Morck, Andrew Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management
Ownership and Market Valuation, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 311 (1988)
(concluding that performance of older firms is worse when the firm is run
by a member of the founding family); Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How
Do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm Value?, 80 J.
FIN. ECON. 385, 399–400 (2006); Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon &
Bernard Yeung, Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and
Growth 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10692,
2004), https://www.nber.org/papers/w10692.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z2ZT694].
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management acumen. The situation is even more egregious
when the controlling holder is no longer an officer or director
of the company but seeks to pass control of the company to a
family member or a favored successor. This situation arose
recently with Viacom, when Sumner Redstone sought to pass
control of the company to his daughter.185
To avoid issues with inheritance of control, investors
should have an opportunity to vote on whether to extend
control benefits to a different generation of the founding
family or another group of individuals to whom the founder
might consider transferring control. This will essentially
allow investors to make a bet on a new individual or group of
managers. In order to allow investors the right to make this
choice, dual-class companies should consider including death
and incapacity provisions in their charters in the future.

4. Separation Sunsets
Separation sunsets should also be included in all dual-class
charters. Separation sunsets were included in the
amendments to the Facebook charter in connection with its
proposed introduction of non-voting Class C common shares.
Separation sunsets are consistent with the Goshen and
Hamdani model of corporate governance: once the founder is
no longer actively involved in the management of the company
as an officer or director, the founder cannot reasonably claim
to be involved in pursuing the idiosyncratic vision for creating
corporate value that justified the establishment of the dualclass share structure. The definition of “cause” for purposes of
the termination clause of the separation sunset should not
establish a bar that is too high to constitute an effective
trigger upon the termination of the entrepreneur-controller as
an executive officer.
In industries where conviction of a felony would disqualify
a person from acting as an executive officer of a company,
sunset provisions should reflect that by making the high vote
185 Keach Hagey, Shari Redstone’s Path to Power, WALL ST. J. (June 22,
2018, 5:32 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/shari-redstones-path-topower-1529659921 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
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shares convert to low vote shares upon an entrepreneurcontroller’s final conviction of a disqualifying felony.

5. Transfer Sunsets
High vote shares should convert on virtually any transfer,
with the exception of transfers for tax and estate planning
purposes. Transfer of high vote shares is inconsistent with the
creation of such shares to support an entrepreneur’s pursuit
of an idiosyncratic vision. The vision in which shareholders
invest is not that of a third-party transferee. Nor is it
necessary to permit transfers to family members or dynastic
control to support an entrepreneur’s pursuit of a value
enhancing idiosyncratic vision. Transfers to family members,
other high vote shareholders, and entities not exclusively
owned by the transferor should lead to conversion of the high
vote shares. Statistical studies have shown that familycontrolled firms controlled by heirs as opposed to the founders
themselves typically experience a decline in firm
performance.186
The permitted entity transfers provision should follow the
Facebook model, which requires exclusive ownership of the
relevant entity by the transferor. The Google model,
permitting transfer when the transferor retains voting and
dispositive control of the high vote shares, permits sharing the
benefit of the high vote shares with parties other than the
founder––which is not necessary to support the founder’s
pursuit of her vision. The trusts provision should, however,
follow the Google approach. Charters should specify
particular types of trusts and require voting and dispositive
control to remain in the hands of the founder. This approach
contrasts with the Facebook approach, which permits
transfers to trusts for which professional trustees or family
members may act as trustees of the trust, with no reference to
retained voting and dispositive control by the founder.
Transfer conversion provisions permitting transfers by
stockholders that are partnerships and LLCs to their partners
or members, as the case may be, are also not necessary to
186

See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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support a founder’s ability to pursue the idiosyncratic value of
control and should not be included. Venture capital funds and
other pre-IPO investors should not receive high vote shares in
connection with the IPO in any event, unless they continue to
be actively involved in the enterprise through representation
on the board of directors of the company, making them
accountable to public investors. However, transfers to cofounders are consistent with the pursuit of an idiosyncratic
vision and should be permitted.

6. Performance Sunsets
As discussed previously, the most challenging aspect of the
theory of idiosyncratic value is that it gives investors little
opportunity to avoid the agency costs inherent in poor
business decisions. Goshen and Hamdani are unbending in
advocating that entrepreneur-controllers should be granted a
property right in their idiosyncratic vision.187 This means that
investors may not fire the entrepreneur-controller as manager
of the corporation even if the idiosyncratic vision leads the
entrepreneur-controller to make poor business decisions that
destroy value.
One way to potentially address the gap between the
expectations of entrepreneur-controllers and investors would
be to establish dual-class sunset provisions focused on
performance measures. A wide variety of performance
measures could be imagined. The ideal performance sunset
would focus on a standard under which even the most
determined entrepreneur-controller would admit that an
idiosyncratic vision for value creation has clearly failed. A
sunset might trigger, for example, if revenue, income, or the
stock price of the company falls below the levels at the time of
the initial public offering for a significant period of time—
perhaps two or three years. Investors should be prepared to
be flexible in thinking about performance sunset measures,
however, as some idiosyncratic visions may take years to
incubate before they start to succeed. If the parties consider
measures on a company-by-company basis, rather than seek a
187

See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 601–03.
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one-size-fits-all solution, performance sunsets are a workable
solution to the entrepreneur-investor control conundrum.
The challenge with performance sunsets is that the
entrepreneur-controller acting as manager will have to
manage the performance of the company in a manner that
successfully survives the performance tests. This challenge is
similar to how managers of public companies with dispersed
ownership engage in earnings management to achieve
performance goals tied to compensation and in connection
with insider trading windows. 188 Thus, performance sunsets,
if used, must be carefully designed in order to avoid gaming.

7. Fiduciary Sunsets
Another option that investors concerned about agency
costs can consider is a fiduciary sunset. The concept of a
fiduciary sunset is simple: if entrepreneur-controllers are
found to have breached their fiduciary duties to shareholders
as officers, directors, or controlling shareholders of the
company, in a manner that is not indemnifiable, consequences
should impact their control of the corporation. In the context
of a company with a single class of stock and dispersed
ownership, such a fiduciary breach by an officer or director
would typically lead to termination, resignation, or removal
from office by the shareholders.189 In the context of a dual188 See Christopher S. Armstrong, David F. Larcker, Gaizka
Ormazabal & Daniel J. Taylor, The Relation Between Equity Incentives and
Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 327, 327
(2013); Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy & Eric G. Wruck,
Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the
Problems, and How to Fix Them 89 (Harvard Bus. Sch. NOM, Working
Paper
No.
04-28,
2004),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=561305
[https://perma.cc/9T6W-ZZGP]; John Bizjak, Rachel M. Hayes &
Swaminathan
L.
Kalpathy,
Performance-Contingent
Executive
Compensation and Managerial Behavior 5 (Dec. 10, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2519246 [https://perma.cc/3HGAZA3X].
189 Ideally, a fiduciary sunset would also cover the obligations of the
entrepreneur-controller to the public investors as a controlling shareholder.
There have been several judicial actions where shareholders have
successfully challenged the control group in a dual-class company. See e.g.,
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class company, the entrepreneur-controller is shielded from
that result.190 To make the dual-class structure more
palatable to institutional investors and other public
stockholders, entrepreneurs wishing to establish a dual-class
structure might consider incorporating consequences for
breach of fiduciary duties that impact the entrepreneurcontroller’s control of the corporation. Shareholder concerns
about control agency risk, and to some extent management
agency risk, might be ameliorated by such a provision. If the
entrepreneur-controller is held to have breached a duty of
care, some kind of sunset of control can kick in. These controls
can be either a limit to the term of the dual-class structure, or
a sharing of control. For example, the sunset might cause
some matters to become subject to minority investor approval.

D. Additional Protections for Dual-Class Investors
Sunset provisions may ultimately be insufficient to protect
investors from the risks of agency costs associated with dualclass share structures. In addition to sunsets, there are other
provisions entrepreneur–controllers can incorporate into
dual-class corporate charters to offer public investors
additional protection against agency costs without accepting
the wholesale transfer of control implicated by time-based
sunset provisions. Among the measures entrepreneurcontrollers can consider offering (and investors can consider
seeking) are (1) pro rata distribution of consideration upon a
change of control, (2) a promise to compensate low vote
shareholders for any charter amendments changing the
corporate governance structure post-IPO or otherwise
Stephen I. Glover & Aarthy S. Thamodaran, Debating the Pros and Cons of
Dual-Class Capital Structures, INSIGHTS, Mar. 2013, at 6. (citing Levco
Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 803 A.2d 428 (Del.
2002); In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7144–VCG, 2012 WL
729232, at *14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012)).
190 While controlling shareholders are not typically subject to
termination or a loss of control in connection with a breach of fiduciary
duties to the minority, that still might be a rational resolution to the tension
between the entrepreneur’s and investors’ competing desires for control of
the company.
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adversely affecting the rights of the low vote investors, and (3)
power-sharing arrangements, which might, for example, (a)
limit high vote power to certain major corporate decisions—
such as the election of directors and sale of the corporation—
or (b) empower low vote shareholders to vote on equal terms
with the high vote holders on certain corporate matters, such
as executive compensation.

1. Pro Rata Distribution of Change-of-Control
Consideration
One significant concern for public investors in controlled
companies is the prospect of a sale of control or a sale of the
company creating an uneven distribution of the value of the
company to the entrepreneur-controller. Control premiums
have been described as a proxy for private benefits of control
or even as a proxy for minority expropriation.191 While strict
transfer conversion sunset provisions can effectively prevent
a sale of a control position in a dual-class company, they
cannot prevent private bargaining for separate and better
consideration in a sale of the company by an entrepreneurcontroller. Goshen and Hamdani suggest that entrepreneurcontrollers are often willing to share the benefits of value
created through the pursuit of their idiosyncratic visions with
outside investors pro rata. 192 The understanding that all
investors will benefit pro rata from the proceeds of any sale of
the corporation can become part of the explicit bargain
between entrepreneur-controller and public investors at the
time of the IPO through charter provisions stating that all
classes of stock will share equally, pro rata, in the proceeds of
any sale. Alphabet and other companies already have such a
provision in their charter.193 Both Kevin Plank of Under
191 See e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of
Corporate Control, 109 Q.J. ECON. 957, 959–60 (1994).
192 See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 567, 572–73, 576.
193 In addition to Alphabet, other companies with a merger equity
provision include Ameresco, Duluth Holdings, Estee Lauder, FitBit,
Groupon, LinkedIn, MaxLinear, MINDBODY, NCI, News Corp, Nu Skin,
Ralph Lauren, Reata Pharmaceuticals, Skechers, Square, Tableau
Software, Trade Desk, Twilio, Under Armour, Wayfair, Workiva, Yelp, and
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Armor and Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook accepted charter
amendments requiring them to give up control premiums in
connection with the introduction of no vote stock into the
companies’ capital structures as a means of perpetuating their
control of their companies.194

2. Compensation for Charter Alterations
Goshen and Hamdani argue that entrepreneur-controllers
should not be permitted to take advantage of their control
positions to alter corporate governance structures to their
advantage after an initial bargain over governance is struck
in connection with the initial investment in the entrepreneurcontrollers’ enterprises.195 Public investors in low vote shares
should be protected from such (essentially self-dealing)
alterations of the implied contract. They argue, however, that
minority protection should not take the form of an ex ante
approval right, but rather, an ex-post judicial review of such
transactions for fairness to public investors. Otherwise,
holdouts can interfere with the entrepreneur-controller’s
management rights. The ex-post requirement of fair
compensation can, however, be incorporated into the charter
ex ante rather than relying on the varying review standards
of judicial monitoring.
As noted by Goshen and Hamdani, in the past, Delaware
courts have not required shareholders be compensated for
charter amendments, as long as the changes affect all
Zynga. Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review).
194 Facebook, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 67 (June 2,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680116
000074/facebook2016definitiveprox.htm
[https://perma.cc/X5SR-62VP];
Under Armour, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 8 (July 13, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1336917/000119312515251272/d9
31136ddef14a.htm [https://perma.cc/F42X-3XC3].
195 See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 608–09 (“A necessary
element in any minority-protection scheme is, therefore, a protection
against unilateral, midstream changes to the firm’s governance
arrangement”); see also Paul Lee, Note, Protecting the Public Shareholders:
The Case of Google’s Recapitalization, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 292–93
(2015).
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shareholders equally from a legal perspective.196 Entrenching
effects have not provided a cause for compensation. The
leading case is Williams v. Geier, in which the Delaware
Supreme Court held that a controlling shareholder’s vote to
change the charter to impose a tenure voting system was not
self-dealing and did not require application of the entire
fairness doctrine.197 It is possible the Williams case, which is
now twenty years old, would be decided differently if reviewed
today—imposing an entire fairness standard of review for
charter amendments entrenching a controlling shareholder.
In any event, Goshen and Hamdani argue that investors
should be protected from efforts by a controller to change the
mix of control and cash-flow rights mid-stream because an
initial public offering of minority voting equity to the public
established an implicit agreement regarding such rights at
that point in time.198
Two recent mid-course changes have resulted in
compensation to shareholders. The founders of both Google
and Under Armor, after approving charter amendments to
introduce new classes of non-voting common stock in order to
preserve their voting control following additional issuances of
equity, agreed that their company would compensate the
owners of the new non-voting class for the difference between
the market price of the non-voting shares and the market
price of the voting shares.199 Google paid such shareholders

Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 609.
Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1371 (Del. 1996).
198 Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 609.
199 Google, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 99.1 at 7 (Oct. 30,
2013), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/00011931251341
8880/d618226dex991.htm [https://perma.cc/LRD7-4AVE]; Under Armour,
Inc.,
Current
Report
(Form
8-K)
(Oct.
7,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1336917/000133691715000040/oc
tober72015form8-k.htm [https://perma.cc/7LYK-QHBK]; Under Armour,
Inc.,
Current
Report
(Form
8-K)
(June
16,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1336917/000133691716000091/ju
ne162016form8-k.htm [https://perma.cc/6DJB-WCC5].
196
197
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approximately $522 million as a result. 200 Zillow introduced
non-voting common shares in connection with charter
amendments to accommodate its acquisition of Trulia in 2015
and did not face a class action in connection with its charter
changes.201 Under Goshen and Hamdani’s rubric, if such
charter changes had the effect of allowing Zillow’s founders to
control more of the votes with less of the cash flow rights, the
founders (not Zillow) should have compensated the other
shareholders for the change.
In accepting Google’s settlement of class action litigation
regarding the introduction of its non-voting shares, then
Chancellor Strine expressed skepticism about the fact that the
compensation was to be paid by the company, rather than by
the founders, the presumptive beneficiaries of the charter
amendments.202 Strine was also skeptical of the fact that the
compensation would be paid by the company to all holders of
the non-voting shares, including the controlling founders.203
The founders and directors of Facebook and IAC/Interactive
faced class action lawsuits after similarly approving charter
amendments to introduce new classes of non-voting common
stock—in order to perpetuate the founder’s control while
issuing additional equity (or, in Facebook’s case, while
divesting a portion of the founder’s cash flow rights)—and
ultimately had to abandon their efforts.204 Given now-Chief
200 Google, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 99.1 at 3 (Apr. 23,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000128877615
000021/googq12015exhibit991.htm [https://perma.cc/PMU3-F5R5].
201 Zillow Group, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4), at F-1–14
(Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1617640/
000119312514339427/d778624ds4.htm#toc778624_138
[https://perma.cc/ZT43-J7KV].
202 Settlement Hearing and Rulings on the Court at 2–4, In Re Google
Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS, 2013 WL 6735045 (Del. Ch. Oct.
28, 2013).
203 Id.
204 Queenie Wong, Facebook Drops Stock Plan that Would Have
Allowed Zuckerberg to Maintain Control, MERCURY NEWS.COM (Sept. 22,
2017, 5:17 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/09/22/facebook-dropsstock-plan-that-would-have-allowed-zuckerberg-to-maintain-control/
[https://perma.cc/Q893-X237]; Press Release, CalPERS, In Response to
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Justice Strine’s skepticism about the absence of compensation
from the controllers to the minority shareholders in the
Google case, it will be interesting to see what, if any,
settlement terms emerge from those cases, or how the
Delaware courts resolve the disputes going forward. In any
event, for present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the
charters of dual-class companies can include a provision
requiring controlling shareholder compensation of minority
shareholders for adverse changes to the terms of the charter.
As noted above, a more typical provision requiring minority
shareholder approval would not be consistent with Goshen
and Hamdani’s view that solutions to minority shareholder
concerns should not interfere, ex ante, with the controller’s
right to control the company.
Of course, the opposite should also be true; where investors
prevail upon controlling founders to collapse a dual-class
system into a single class of equal voting shares, the controller
should be compensated. Studies and experience have shown
that where both high and low vote (or low and no vote) shares
of an issuer are listed, the low (or no) vote shares typically
trade at a three to five percent discount to the price of the
higher voting shares.205 The no vote shares of Alphabet, Inc.
have traded at such a discount to the low vote shares of
Alphabet since they were listed in 2013. 206 We can assume,
therefore, that a discount is incorporated into the price of low
CalPERS Lawsuit, IAC Abandons Plan to Issue Non-Voting Stock (June 23,
2017),
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/newsroom/calpers-news/2017
/interactivecorp-abandons-plan-non-voting-stock [https://perma.cc/PU2M5PEB].
205 Dan Caplinger, What the Google Stock Split Taught Investors About
Corporate Governance, MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 1, 2016, 5:33 PM),
https://www.fool.com/investing/2016/09/01/what-the-google-stock-splittaught-investors-about.aspx [https://perma.cc/7PV4-PB9N]; Aaron Stumpf
& Andrew Cline, Price Differentials Between Voting and Nonvoting Stock,
STOUT, https://www.stoutadvisory.com/insights/article/price-differentialsbetween-voting-and-nonvoting-stock [https://perma.cc/49G9-8U9K].
206 Jesse Emspak, GOOG or GOOGL: Which Stock Do You Buy?,
INVESTOPEDIA (June 28, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.investopedia.com/
articles/markets/052215/goog-or-googl-which-google-should-you-buy.asp
[https://perma.cc/VTL9-F5NM].
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vote shares of a dual-class company listed at the time of its
initial public offering. That is, public investors benefit from a
lower initial price, while founders settle for a lower price for
the shares of their companies than they could obtain if they
did not retain control through a dual-class structure.207
When institutional investors insist that the boards of dualclass companies establish time-based sunset provisions to
phase out the structure over time so they will have equal
voting rights in the future, they should understand that they
are asking for a right they have not paid for. Such
shareholders should arguably pay a premium to the company
in connection with receiving equal voting rights in such
situations. In practice, low vote shareholders have not
typically paid companies for additional voting rights in
connection with dual-class reclassifications, but in some cases,
holders of high vote shares have, appropriately, been
compensated for their loss of control. For example, when
Hubbell Inc. reclassified its shares into a single class of voting
common in 2015, high vote shareholders received a special
dividend of $200 million.208 When Forest City Enterprises
collapsed its dual-class structure in 2017, the high vote
shareholders received a thirty-one percent premium (in

207 When institutional investors say, with respect to high performing
dual-class companies, that they should have equal voting shares just in case
things go bad in the future, they are essentially suggesting that the market
is not properly pricing the risk that such management failures could occur
in the future. This is an odd result given the extent to which other risks,
such as the risk of bankruptcy, are perceived to be accurately priced into
the market values of securities, including high yield bonds. If investors
believe the risk of poor management performance in the future is not
properly reflected in the share price of a dual-class company, they ought to
short the shares.
208 Hubbell Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) exhibit 99.1 at 2 (Aug. 24,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/48898/
000119312515299447/d26695dex991.htm [https://perma.cc/PW2W-7BCD];
Hubbell Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 23, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/48898/000119312515412174/d110
573d8k.htm [https://perma.cc/5W3G-DXWX].
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common shares) on their high vote shares upon conversion.209
In both of these cases, the compensation was provided by the
company rather than other shareholders.210

3. Selective Power Sharing: Majority of the
Minority Votes
Entrepreneur-controllers could agree to obtain majority-ofthe-minority votes with respect to corporate decisions
otherwise reserved to the managers or the board, in much the
same way as venture investors holding preferred shares are
often given voting power with respect to significant corporate
decisions. This would give the entrepreneur-controller day-today management discretion of the company while giving
investors some levers to protect their interests. The
compensation of executives is one matter as to which
shareholders are already required to be given a non-binding
vote. Their vote could be made binding. There may be other
areas in which power-sharing could be considered, such as
incurrence of debt over certain amounts, acquisitions over a
certain value, or other significant corporate decisions.

VIII.CONCLUSION
There is a fundamental tension, or tradeoff, between
entrepreneurs’ freedom to pursue idiosyncratic visions for
value creation and investors’ need for protection from agency
costs. This tension is particularly acute in the context of dualclass companies, where the entrepreneur’s uncontestable and
indefinite control, coupled with the entrepreneur’s smaller
equity interest, leaves investors with comparatively high
exposure to agency costs. It is not surprising, then, that
institutional investors have responded to recent increases in
the number of dual-class IPOs with calls for prohibition,

209 Forest City Realty Tr., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) exhibit 3.1
at 7 (June 12, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1647509/
000119312517201428/d411995dex31.htm [https://perma.cc/M2MP-RXJS].
210 Arguably, low vote shareholders should be paying high vote
shareholders directly for the acquisition of control rights.
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termination or strict limitation, while entrepreneurs and their
lawyers insist on maintaining the private ordering status quo.
A thorough review of the terms of dual-class stock
structures reveals that the tension between entrepreneurs
and institutional investors over control of emerging
companies can be resolved through careful drafting of
corporate charters to reflect the fundamental bargain between
the parties––money for vision––and the interests underlying
their respective bids for control: security from interference or
dismissal for the entrepreneur and opportunity for voice and
influence for investors. When the terms of dual-class share
structures are considered in detail, we can identify creative
ways to give entrepreneurs the control they seek—for as long
as they want it, in a manner that does not compromise
accountability—and incentivize careful stewardship of
corporate assets. Given the diversity among entrepreneurs
and companies in terms of vision, execution, industry, and
competition, this is not a one-size-fits-all exercise. While in
some cases it should be possible to negotiate a set of sunset
provisions that satisfy investor concerns, in other cases it may
be necessary to resort to sunrise provisions that enhance
investor influence, such as a public investor right to nominate
and elect a minority of the board of directors.
As noted in Part V, law firms advising companies pursuing
initial public offerings have tremendous influence in
determining the terms of dual-class stock structures. If, as
suggested by Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati’s response to
institutional investor calls for prohibition or strict limitation
of dual-class stock structures, such firms wish to preserve the
current system of private ordering in designing such stock
structures, they have a responsibility to be more creative and
proactive in designing structures that respond more
effectively to investors’ concerns while retaining founders’
ability to pursue their visions for value creation without
undue interference or dismissal. As explained in Part VII,
there are many different ways to approach that effort.
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APPENDIX
A. Dual-Class Data Set Companies Listed by DualClass Adoption or Listing Year
2017
ACM Research, Inc.
Altair Engineering, Inc.
Alteryx, Inc.
Appian Corp.
Bandwidth, Inc.
Blue Apron Holdings, Inc.
CarGurus, Inc.
Carvana Co.
Hamilton Lane, Inc.
Laureate Education, Inc.
MuleSoft, Inc.
Newmark Group, Inc.
Okta, Inc.
Roku, Inc.
Schneider National, Inc.
Snap, Inc.
Stitch Fix, Inc.

2016
Apptio, Inc.
CommerceHub, Inc.
Nutanix, Inc.
Reata Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Red Rock Resorts, Inc.
SecureWorks Corp.
Trade Desk, Inc.
Twilio, Inc.

2015
Appfolio, Inc.
Box, Inc.
Duluth Holdings, Inc.
First Data Corp.
Fitbit, Inc.
Houlihan Lokey, Inc.
Inovalon Holdings, Inc.
MINDBODY, Inc.
Pure Storage, Inc.
RMR Group, Inc.
Square, Inc.
Summit Materials, Inc.
Virtu Financial, Inc.

2014
Castlight Health, Inc.
Fifth Street Asset
Management, Inc.
GoPro, Inc.
Medley Management, Inc.
Moelis & Company
Phibro Animal Health Corp.
Wayfair, Inc.
Workiva, Inc.

939

2018.3_WINDEN_FINAL

940

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2018

2013
Coty, Inc.
Fairway Group Holdings
Corp.
News Corp.
(Spin-off from old News
Corp.)
Re/Max Holdings, Inc.
RingCentral, Inc.
Tableau Software, Inc.
Veeva Systems, Inc.
William Lyon Homes
zulily, Inc.
(Acquired in 2015)

2012
Facebook, Inc.
Globus Medical, Inc.
Kayak Software, Inc.
(Acquired in 2013)
Tilly’s Inc.
Workday, Inc.
Yelp, Inc.

2011
AMC Networks, Inc.
(Spin-off from Cablevision)
Groupon, Inc.
(Sunset in 2016)
LinkedIn Corp.
TripAdvisor, Inc.
Zillow Group, Inc.
(Initially Zillow, Inc.)
Zynga, Inc.

2010
Ameresco, Inc.
Ironwood Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.
Madison Square Garden Co.,
The
(Spin-off from Cablevision)
MaxLinear, Inc.
(Sunset in 2017)
Swift Transportation Company

2009
Hyatt Hotels Corporation

2008
Discovery Communications,
Inc.
Scripps Networks Interactive,
Inc.

2007
Pzena Investment
Management, Inc.
EchoStar Corporation

2006
Spirit Aerosystems Holdings,
Inc.

2005
Dolby Laboratories, Inc.
DSW, Inc.

2004
Alphabet, Inc.
(initially Google, Inc.)
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Molson Coors Brewing Co.
NCI, Inc.
Under Armour, Inc.
Viacom, Inc.
(Spin-off
from
CBS
Corporation)

DreamWorks Animation SKG,
Inc.
Marchex, Inc.
Texas Roadhouse, Inc.
(Sunset in 2009)
Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.
(Initially incorporated as
News Corp.)

2003
Nelnet, Inc.
Nexstar Media Group, Inc.

2002
Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc.
ManTech International Corp.
Regal Entertainment Group

2001
Expedia, Inc.
(IPO 1999)

1999
Skechers U.S.A., Inc.
United Parcel Service, Inc.

1998
Broadcom Corp.
Federated Investors, Inc.

1997
Ralph Lauren Corp.

1996
Genesee & Wyoming, Inc.
IAC/InterActive Corp.
(Listed in 1992)
Lamar Advertising Co.
Lennar Corp.
Nu Skin Enterprises, Inc.

1995
Boston Beer, Inc., The
DISH Networks, Inc.
Estee Lauder Companies Inc.,
The
MSC Industrial Direct Co., Inc.

1994
Apollo Education Group, Inc.
(Acquired in 2016)
Erie Indemnity Co.

1991
Panera Bread Co.
Regeneron Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.

1987
Rockwell Automation
(Sunset in 1997)
Tootsie Roll Industries
(Listed in 1922)

1986
Cablevision Systems Corp.
(Acquired in 2016)
CBS Corp.
(Initially, Viacom, Inc.)
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Meredith Corporation
(Listed in 1978)
1984
Vishay Intertechnology, Inc.
Watsco, Inc.

1983
A.O. Smith Corporation

1982
John Wiley & Sons
(Listed in 1962)

1980
Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc.
(Listed in 1966)
Nike, Inc.
Universal Health Services, Inc.

1981
Telephone & Data Systems,
Inc.

1979
Eaton Vance

1978
Brown-Forman Corp.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc.
(Converted to Forest City
Realty Trust in 2016;
converted to single class in
2017)
Hershey Co., The
Tyson Foods, Inc.

1973
Constellation Brands, Inc.

1972
Comcast Corp.
Molex, Inc.
(Acquired in 2013)

1971
Graham Holdings Co.
(IPO as Washington Post
Company)

1967
New York Times Co.

1960
HEICO Corp.

1956
Ford Motor Co.

1936
Hubbell, Inc.
(Reclassified to single class
in 2015)
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B. Time-based, Dilution and Divestment Sunsets

Timebased
Sunset

Year of
listing
1999 and
earlier
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

No
Sunsets

2
3
1
3
2
3
2
3

1
1
1
2
2
1
2

2
2
1
4
7
2
5

Total

62

10

36

28

Dilution
Sunset

Divestment
Sunset

8

7

1
2
1
4
5

Timebased
and
Dilution

Time-based
and
Divestment

Total

1

44

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
2

1
1

2
1

1
2
1
1

1
2

1
1
5

1

16

12

3

1
3
2
5
6
1
2
2
1
5
6
6
9
8
13
8
17
139
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C. Death and Incapacity Sunsets

Year
listing

of

or
Holder
Founder
or
Death
Incapacity

or

Holder
or
Death
Founder
or
Death
Incapacity
Holder
Founder
Death
Founder
or
Death
Incapacity
Founder
Death
Holder
or
Death
Incapacity
Holder
w/
Death
Exceptions
Holder
Death
No Death or
Incapacity
Sunset
Total

1999 and
earlier
2002

2003

2004

2005

4

2001

3

6

2000

1

1

2

5

1

2

2

1

1

3

1

42

1

2

44
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2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

3

8

5

2009

1

9

2008

2 (2)

1

2

6

2007

1 (1)

1

1

1

2 (2)

1

2 (1)

1

1 (1)

3

6

1 (1)

1

5

2

2

1

2006

1

2

2

1 (1)

1

2

1 (1)

1
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2015
2016

4 (4)

2017

7

Total

5

7

6

4 (4)

2 +2*

8

5

2 (2)

1 (1)

1 (1)

2 (1)

1 (1)

1 (1)

91

5

5

139

2

5

17

5

7

8

1 (1)

13

Figures in parenthesis show where shares held by permitted transferees also convert.
*Two companies had both provisions for conversion of shares upon holder death and collapse of
the dual-class structure upon founder death. They are counted in the former group for purposes
of totals.
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D. Transfer Sunsets

Year of listing

3

1999 and
earlier

2 (1)

Charities
Permitted
Permitted if
and
Voting
Dispositive
Power
Retained
Controlled
(exclusive)
Entities
Permitted

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

Affiliates,
Partners,
Shareholders
Permitted

1

2

Family
Permitted

10

4

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

Family Only

2

2
2

No Transfers

1

30

Not
Family
Permitted

Founders
Permitted

Other Holders
Permitted

1
Free Transfer
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2006

1

1

2007

1
1

2008

2

2009

1

2010

1

2011

3

2012

2013

2014

2

1

3

2 (2)

1

3

1

1

1

4

1

3

2 (1)

1

1
1

1

3
1

3
1

2

1

2

2

3

2
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2015

1

8

2016

3

7

2

2017

32

11

Total

17 (11)

2

8

1 (1)

1

1
2

23

13

4
1

4

29

2

1

3

11

48

5

25

1

2

9

7
2

1

1

2
1

1
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E. Companies Listing Both High- and Low-Vote
Shares
Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc.
Brown-Forman, Inc.
CBS Corp.
Constellation Brands, Inc.
Discovery Communications, Inc.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc.
HEICO Corp.
Hubbell, Inc.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Molson Coors Brewing Co.
Molex, Inc.
News Corp
Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.
Viacom, Inc.
Watsco, Inc.

F. Dual-Class Data Set Companies with Time-Based
Sunsets
ACM Research, Inc., listed 2017 (five years)
Altair Engineering, Inc., listed 2017 (twelve years)
Alteryx, Inc., listed 2017 (ten years)
Apptio, Inc., listed 2016 (seven years)
Castlight Health, Inc., listed 2014 (ten years)
Fitbit, Inc., listed 2015 (twelve years)
Groupon, Inc., listed 2011 (five years)
Hamilton Lane, Inc., listed 2017 (ten years)
Ironwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc., listed 2010 (eight or
twenty-eight years)
Kayak Software Corporation, listed 2012 (seven years)
MaxLinear, Inc., listed 2010 (seven years)
MINDBODY, Inc., listed 2015 (seven years)
MuleSoft, Inc., listed 2017 (five years)
Nutanix, Inc., listed 2016 (seventeen years)
Okta, Inc., listed 2017 (ten years)
Pure Storage, Inc., listed 2015 (ten years)
Re/Max Holdings, Inc., listed 2013 (five years)
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RingCentral, Inc., listed 2015 (seven years)
Rockwell Automation, Inc., listed 1987 (ten years)
Stitch Fix, Inc., listed 2017 (10 years)
Texas Roadhouse, Inc., listed 2004 (five years)
Twilio, Inc., listed 2016 (seven years)
Veeva Systems, Inc., listed 2013 (ten years)
Workday, Inc., listed 2012 (twenty years)
Yelp, Inc., listed 2012 (seven years)

G. Dual-Class Data Set Companies with Both Death
and Incapacity Sunset Triggers
Altair Engineering, Inc.
Apptio, Inc.
Bandwidth, Inc.
Blue Apron Holdings, Inc.
Box, Inc.
Fairway Group Holdings Corp.
Groupon, Inc.
Laureate Education, Inc.
LinkedIn Corp.
MINDBODY, Inc.
Moelis & Company
MuleSoft, Inc.
Okta, Inc.
RingCentral, Inc.
RMR Group, Inc.
Square, Inc.
Texas Roadhouse, Inc.
Tilly’s Inc.
Twilio, Inc.
Under Armour, Inc.
Veeva Systems, Inc.
Workday, Inc.
Yelp, Inc.
Zillow, Inc.
zulily, Inc.
Zynga, Inc.
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